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ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
INSURERS’ EXPECTATIONS:
CAN STATES UNILATERALLY QUASH
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
UNDER THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT?
Mary Pennisi *
“The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration . . . .” 1
“The greater number of arbitration agreements that federal courts
will, in all likelihood, be called upon to enforce, will fall within the
scope of the state laws.” 2

INTRODUCTION
Commercial parties worldwide rely on arbitration clauses to

*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Political Science,
Philosophy of Law, and Economics, summa cum laude, Macaulay Honors College at
Brooklyn College, City University of New York, 2008. I would like to thank Professors
John Feerick and Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel of the American Arbitration
Association, for their guidance, input and expertise. I would also like to thank Corey
Worcester, Esq. for encouraging me to study arbitration and continue my academic
research and writing during my last year of law school. Furthermore, I remain grateful
to my mentor Michael Grohman, Esq. for his ongoing support and inspiration to pursue
my legal studies. Finally, special thanks are due to the Editors and Staff of the
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their hard work throughout the
publication process and to my mother, Danny, and Doyle for their continuous
encouragement, love, and infinite patience.
1. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
2. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 428, 445 (1931).
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mitigate the high risks inherent in international business transactions. 3
A split in federal circuit courts has recently emerged and left the validity
of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts under the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement of Arbitral
Agreements (the “New York Convention” or the “Convention”) in a
state of uncertainty. 4 The New York Convention mandates that United
States federal courts enforce arbitration agreements among international
parties. 5 Article II specifically requires signatories to “recognize an
agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise
between them . . . concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.” 6 In the context of insurance, however, numerous states
have enacted statutes that render arbitration agreements unenforceable. 7
3. Geoffrey Robb & Kevin Canty, Dispute Resolution Developments: Selecting
Law, Jurisdiction, and Arbitration in Marine Insurance Policies, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J.
325 (2003).
4. Compare Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) with Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir.
1995).
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(2002)) [hereinafter New York Convention].
6. Id. at 1.
7. See Ark. Code Ann. 16-108-201(b) (arbitration agreements “shall have no
application to . . . any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy”); Ga. Code
Ann. § 9-9-2(c)(3) (arbitration agreements “shall not apply” to “any contract of
insurance”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401(c) (arbitration agreements “shall not apply to . . .
[c]ontracts of insurance”); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.050(2) (noting that disputes under
“insurance contracts” are not arbitrable); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:629a (“[n]o insurance
contract . . . shall contain any . . . agreement . . . depriving the courts . . . of the
jurisdiction of action against the insurer”); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 435.350 (excluding
“contracts of insurance”); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(2)(c) (explaining that insurance
contracts are not arbitrable); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-2602(f)(4) (“enforcement of
written contracts requiring parties to submit to arbitration does not apply to . . . any
agreement . . . relating to an insurance policy other than a contract between insurance
companies including a reinsurance contract”); Ok. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 802 (“shall not
apply to . . . contracts with reference to insurance except for those contracts between
insurance companies”); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-25A-3 (“does not apply to insurance
policies”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5653 (“does not apply . . . to arbitration agreements
contained in a contract of insurance”). See also MITCHELL F. DOLIN & CATHERINE E.
LONG, 1 LAW AND PRAC. OF INS. COVERAGE LITIG. § 11:22 (2010) (“At least eleven
states that have enacted laws providing generally for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements specifically refuse to allow arbitration of insurance disputes.”).
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They have accordingly invalidated international insurers’ arbitration
agreements under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA” or the “Act”),
which allows state law regulating the “business of insurance” to reversepreempt federal law. 8 Under this statute, which Congress originally
enacted in 1945 to preserve states’ rights to regulate the insurance
industry and prevent federal prosecutors from targeting insurers’
practices under the federal antitrust laws, states have refused to enforce
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, despite the New York
Convention. 9
On November 9, 2009, Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London created a split in federal circuit courts
over whether the MFA reverse-preempts the New York Convention and
allows states to circumvent the United States’ national policy favoring
arbitration by invalidating global insurers’ arbitration agreements. 10 The
Fifth Circuit 11 and several district courts 12 have held that the MFA does
not reverse-preempt any treaty and that the New York Convention
therefore protects arbitration agreements in international insurance

8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b). Typically, under the Supremacy Clause, federal law
preempts inconsistent state law. Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d
585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. However, the McCarran-Ferfuson
Act’s reverse-preemption provision enables state law regulating the insurance industry
to supersede or “reverse-preempt” federal law. See Elizabeth K. Stanley, Parties’
Defenses to Binding Arbitration Agreements in The Health Care Field & The Operation
of The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 38 St. Mary’s L.J. 591, 606 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 724-25.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In re Arbitration Between The West of England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
(Luxembourg) and American Marine Corp., 1992 WL 37700 (E.D. La. 1992); Antillean
Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., No. 02-22196-CIV, 2002
WL 32075793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002); Jantran, Inc. v. Sphere Drake Ins.,
P.L.C., No. Civ.A.2:96CV085-D-B, 1997 WL 88259 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 18, 1997);
Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1995); McDermott Int’l, Inc.
v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, Civ. A. No. 91-841, 1992 WL 37695 (E.D. La.
Feb. 14, 1992); Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc.,
847 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd v. Portsmouth Settlement
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London v. Simon, 2007 WL 3047128 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of
British Columbia, 2007 WL 2292689, *4 (D.Or. Aug 06, 2007) (“[M]ore recent and
significantly more persuasive authority concludes that the Convention supersedes the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.”).
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contracts. In contrast, the Second Circuit 13 has held that the MFA
reverse-preempts the New York Convention because it is a non-selfexecuting treaty and it directly preempts the Convention’s implementing
legislation. As international insurers have increasingly relied on
arbitration agreements, this circuit split is timely and likely to impact
global business relations.
This Note examines the split in federal circuit courts created by
Safety National Casualty Corp. on whether the MFA reverse-preempts
the New York Convention and allows states to quash arbitration
agreements in international insurance contracts. Part I examines the
legal framework governing arbitration in the United States, including the
New York Convention and Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 14 It also
explores the current state of insurance arbitration and the MFA. 15
Furthermore, Part I briefly reviews the doctrine of preemption and the
status of treaties in United States law. Part II discusses the split in
federal authority, particularly both sides’ interpretations of United States
foreign relations law and the MFA. 16 Part III proposes two possible
resolutions to the conflict in authority, both legislative and judicial. 17
Part III.A suggests that Congress should amend the MFA to exempt the
New York Convention in light of the United States’ national policy
favoring arbitration and the importance of arbitration in promoting
international business. 18 Part III.B offers a judicial solution. 19 It
contends that the Supreme Court should hold that the MFA does not
enable state law to reverse-preempt the New York Convention or enable
states to thwart arbitrations of disputes concerning insurance contracts. 20
This Note concludes that Congress and the Supreme Court should ensure
that states do not have unlimited power to preclude international
commercial parties from enforcing mutually agreed-upon arbitration
clauses in insurance contracts. 21

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 41 (2nd Cir. 1995).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See id.
See infra Conclusion.
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part explains the language and legislative history of the New
York Convention, FAA, and MFA. It also briefly reviews United States
foreign relations law concerning the status of treaties.
A. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Enacted in 1945, the MFA protects states’ rights to regulate the
insurance industry. 22 The MFA has led the insurance industry to remain
the only financial institution exclusively “subject to plenary state
regulation.” 23
1. Statutory Text
The MFA recognizes that states have power to regulate and tax the
insurance industry. 24 It states, “Congress hereby declares that the
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance is in the public interest.” 25 It therefore provides that, “[n]o
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless
such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .” 26 By
precluding an “Act of Congress” from “invalidat[ing], impair[ing], or
supersed[ing]” a state law regulating insurance, the MFA enables state
law 27 to reverse-preempt a federal statute unless the federal statute
22.
23.

15 U.S.C. § 1011.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945: Reconceiving The Federal Role Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 14
(1993) (“Among major financial institutions in the United States, only insurance firms
are subject to plenary state regulation.”).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added).
27. The state must have enacted the law for the purpose of regulating the insurance
industry. See, e.g., Autry v. Northwest Premium Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1045 (7th
Cir. 1998) (finding that an Illinois statute governing insurance premium finance
agreements was not “enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,”
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s “protective umbrella” therefore did not apply or
reverse-preempt the Federal Truth in Lending Act). The Act only protects state statutes
that regulate the “business of insurance.” Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l Sec., Inc.,
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“specifically relates to the business of insurance.” 28 In other words,
under section 1012, a state law reverse-preempts a federal law if (1) the
state law was enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance,” (2) the federal statute does not “specifically relate to the
business of insurance,” and (3) the federal statute would “invalidate,
impair, or supersede” the state law. 29 All courts agree that the New
393 U.S. 453 (1969). Whether a statute regulates the business of insurance is a
threshold question for courts. Id. The Supreme Court has explained that Congress only
intended the Act to apply to the “relationship between insurer and insured, the type of
policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement.” Id.
Therefore, state statutes seeking to protect or govern the relationship between the
insured and insurer constitute regulations related to the “business of insurance.” Id.
Courts determine whether a regulated practice constitutes the “business of insurance”
by considering whether the practice (1) has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder’s risk; (2) is integral in the policy relationship between the insurer and
insured; and (3) is limited to entities within the insurance industry. Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 120 (1982); see also Fuller v. Olson, 907 F. Supp. 257
(W.D. Mich. 1995); United States v. Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 892 F.
Supp. 370 (D.R.I. 1995), judgment aff’d, 80 F.3d 616 (1st Cir. 1996); CenTra, Inc. v.
Chandler Ins. Co., Ltd., 248 Neb. 844, 540 N.W.2d 318 (1995). Courts have found that
the following practices fall within the “business of insurance”: actual performance of an
insurance contract, United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993),
“retirement” certificates of deposit, American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834
(7th Cir. 1996), statutory mandates concerning benefits and liability among insurance
carriers, United of Omaha v. Bus. Men’s Assur. Co. of Am., 104 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir.
1997), rate-making activity by insurers, Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on
Comp. Ins., Inc., 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996), workers’ compensation reinsurance
pools, id., the National Council on Compensation Insurance, id. Alternatively, courts
have found the following statutes do not relate to the business of insurance: (1) a state
law allowing individuals to copy state filed insurance documents, B & S Underwriters,
Inc. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 892 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. La. 1995), and (2) a state law
allowing a third party to switch insurance beneficiaries under a power of attorney,
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 897 F. Supp. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 18 (2d
Cir. 1996). Some courts contend that state statutes prohibiting arbitration do not
regulate the business of insurance and the MFA therefore does not protect or enable
them to reverse preempt the FAA or the New York Convention. See, e.g., Mut.
Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1992);
Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. West, 267 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2001). But see
THOMAS H. OEHMKE, 2 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 32:1 (2010) (“[A] provision in a
state’s arbitration code excepting insurance contracts is a law regulating the business of
insurance”). Although this view warrants further discussion, it remains outside of this
Note’s scope.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
29. See Suter v. Munich Reinsurance Co., 223 F.3d 150, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
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York Convention does not “specifically relate[] to the business of
insurance” under the MFA. 30 If the application of a federal statute
would not interfere or conflict with a state’s regulatory regime, then the
federal measure may apply. 31 Alternatively, if a federal measure
specifically relates to the insurance industry, then it may trump state
law. 32
2. Legislative History
Congress passed the MFA when panic ran rampant among members
of the insurance industry after the Supreme Court declared that
insurance constituted interstate commerce subject to the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act. The history of state-driven regulation of the insurance
industry is unique and starkly contrasts with the regulatory history of
related industries such as financial services and banking, which are
subject to robust federal regulations. 33 In the mid-nineteenth century,
states began regulating the insurance industry to abate the rampant
instability and insolvencies that resulted from fierce competition among
insurers. 34 State regulatory bodies mainly rated insurance bureaus and
Fabe, 508 U.S. at 491 (1993) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b))).
30. Id.; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London, 587 F.3d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 2009).
31. See Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 300 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Lovilia Coal Co. v. Williams, 143 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) specifically relates to the business of
insurance and preempts state insurance law).
33. Since 1933, Congress, the courts, and the Securities Exchange Commission
have expanded federal regulation over the securities industry, which coexist with state
“blue sky” laws. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 (1991); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1984); Paul Curran Kingsbery, Stakeholder Inclusion
and Shareholder Protection: New Governance and The Changing Landscape of
American Securities Regulation, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 913, 922-23 (2009) (explaining
options for regulatory change in the securities industry). Likewise, federal regulation in
the banking industry grew after Congress enacted the Banking Act in 1863 and national
banks emerged. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in
the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 678 (1988) (“Federal preemption
and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in banking
regulation.”); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 20.
34. See Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 411,
411 (1981) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and
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pooled risk data. 35 Each state opened an insurance department to
formulate regulations. 36 In 1868, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Paul v. Virginia that the insurance industry was exclusively within the
states’ domain and declared that the practice of issuing insurance
policies did not constitute interstate commerce subject to Congress’
commerce power. 37 The Supreme Court and lower courts subsequently
reaffirmed that the states retained regulatory power over the industry. 38
By the early twentieth century, state regulation became the industry
norm. 39 In 1944, however, the Supreme Court undermined the sound
foundation that Paul had established in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n (S.E.U.A.). 40 In this case, the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice prosecuted the S.E.U.A. along with its 198
Marketing of Insurance 5-8 (1977)).
35. Id. at 412.
36. Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for
Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L. J. 587, 589-90 (1978); 90
CONG. REC. A4403-04 (1944); Brook, Public Interest and the Commissioners-All
Industry Laws, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 606 (1950); Lent, supra note 34, at 411.
37. 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (“Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce . . . .”); see also Lent, supra note 34, at 411. The Commerce Clause
empowers Congress “[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states . . . .” U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3; Weller, supra note 36, at 589 (“In the
leading case, Paul v. Virginia, Supreme Court dictum that ‘[i]ssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce’ was considered by many to mean that the
federal government had no authority over the insurance industry under the commerce
clause.”); Richard C. Reier, Casenote, Debate on State Versus Federal Regulation of
Insurance Continues: American General Insurance Co. v. FTC, 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), 53 NEB. L. REV. 289, 291 (1974).
38. Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate
Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV.
545, 553 (1958) (“From 1868 to 1944 it was generally assumed that insurance was not
commerce, and was not subject to federal regulation.”); Peter B. Steffen, After Fabe:
Applying the Pireno Definition of “Business of Insurance” in First-Clause McCarranFerguson Act Clauses, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 447 (“[T]he Paul Court likened
issuing an insurance policy to agreeing to a personal contract, describing both as
distinctly local transactions.”); Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern Underwriters’
Decision and Its Effect, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 321, 321 (1947); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495, 502 (1913).
39. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 553; Steffen, supra note 38, at 447; Weller,
supra note 36, at 589.
40. United States v. South East Underwriters Ass’n (S.E.U.A), 322 U.S. 533
(1944); Reier, supra note 37, at 291; 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945) (statements of Rep.
Hancock).
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member companies in Georgia for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act
by allegedly (1) fixing premium rates and agents’ commissions, (2)
coercing nonmember companies into joining the S.E.U.A., and (3)
conspiring to force individuals to buy from members on specified
terms. 41 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleged
that a merger agreement between two insurance companies, the
American General Insurance Company and the Deposit Company of
Maryland, would substantially diminish competition and create a
monopoly in violation of the Clayton Act. 42 In a swift reverse that
“shocked the industry” and contradicted 75 years of practice, 43 the Court
decided that federal regulations, particularly the Sherman Antitrust Act,
applied to the insurance industry because insurance transactions
constituted “interstate commerce” under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 44 The Court then found that the Sherman
Antitrust Act prohibited ratemaking combinations among defendantinsurance companies. 45
S.E.U.A. thrusted “[t]he entire industry [] in[to a state of] turmoil,
[as insurance companies] expect[ed] to be abruptly subject to the full
onus of federal antitrust legislation and possible federal takeover of
insurance.” “[S]ome insurance men thought the end of the world was
come.” 46 The decision uprooted companies’ longstanding expectations
of state regulation, 47 and panic quickly ensued. 48 Many feared that the
Supreme Court would invalidate all state insurance regulations as
unconstitutional. 49 Insurance companies nationwide therefore protested
41.
42.
43.

S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 535 (1944).
Id.
See Lent, supra note 34, at 411; see also R.K. Powers, A Year of S.E.U.A., 23
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 317, 317 (1945).
44. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 552-56; see also Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern
Underwriters’ Decision and Its Effect, 1947 WIS. L. REV. 321, 322 (“The decision is
very clear on the point that insurance is commerce and, insofar as transactions which
cross state lines are concerned, interstate commerce.”).
45. S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 552-56.
46. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554; Powers, supra note 43, at 320;
Weller, supra note 36, at 590 (“The decision precipitated widespread controversy and
dismay. Chaos was freely predicted.”) (citing NEW YORK INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
REPORT 71 (1969)).
47. See Lent, supra note 34, at 421; Reier, supra note 37, at 291; 91 CONG. REC.
1087 (1945) (statements of Rep. Hancock)).
48. See supra note 46.
49. See id.
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against paying state taxes. 50 Indeed, in his dissent in S.E.U.A., Chief
Justice Stone even predicted “a flood of litigation and of legislation
involving challenges to the tax laws.” 51 Insurance companies also
feared imminent criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act for ratefixing practices. 52 They vociferously called upon Congress to enact
legislation to re-empower states to exclusively tax and regulate the
industry. 53
S.E.U.A. also shocked Congress and state legislatures. 54 They
feared that the federal government would totally assume the states’
mandate of regulating the insurance industry 55 and that the Roosevelt
administration sought to federalize insurance regulation. 56 In an address
to state insurance commissioners, Senator Ferguson stated, “there is a
domination today by the bureaucracy and there were a few people . . . in
Washington that were licking their chops when they knew that the
United States Supreme Court declared that the insurance business of
America was interstate commerce.” 57 Overall, the fate of insurance
regulation remained uncertain. 58 The resulting widespread concern and
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id.
S.E.U.A., 322 U.S. at 583 (Stone, J., dissenting).
See Weller, supra note 36, at 590.
See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554 (“But this emergency is immediate
and it is necessary to pass this legislation now. The States do not know what to do -with
respect to the collection of taxes and the insurance companies do not know what to do
with respect to the payment of taxes.”); see also 91 CONG. REC. 1092 (1945).
54. J. Logan Murphy, Law Triangle: Arbitrating International Reinsurance
Disputes Under the New York Convention, The McCarran-Ferguson Act, and
Antagonistic State Law, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1535, 1544 (2008) (“The decision
sparked an uproar that resounded through both Congress and state insurance
departments.”); Weller, supra note 36, at 590 (quoting NEW YORK INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT REPORT 71 (1969)) (“The decision precipitated widespread controversy
and dismay. Chaos was freely predicted.”); Harrington, An Exploration of the Effects of
the S.E.U.A. Decision, 1944 INS. L. J. 590 (1944); Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at
554 (1958); Lent, supra note 34, at 412.
55. See Murphy, supra note 54, at 1545 (“There existed a real fear of a federal
takeover of the (previously assumed) state prerogative to regulate the insurance
industry.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 591.
56. See Weller, supra note 36, at 591.
57. See id. (quoting 1947 NAIC PAOC. 69, 74 (remarks of Sen. Ferguson, Dec. 11,
1946)).
58. See Powers, supra note 43, at 320 (quoting The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed.,
June 9, 1944, p. 1.) (“Insurance D Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower’s D Day
. . . the mental commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn
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dismay led Congress to take action, which eventually crystallized into
the MFA. 59
In response to the public’s outrage and the Supreme Court’s
upheaval of commercial expectations, Congress swiftly acted to restore
certainty in the insurance industry and preserve its century-long norm of
state-regulation. 60 The MFA was a “very hastily formulated response.” 61
Anticipating that the Supreme Court would further infringe upon states’
rights, Congress agreed that the Act should re-empower state insurance
commissioners to tax and regulate the industry. 62 In articulating the
Act’s objectives, Congress declared that it should ensure that no other
federal law could “invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law which
regulates . . . the insurance business, unless such act specifically so
provides.” 63 However, Congress remained divided over how to best
achieve the proper balance of power. 64
The House deliberated over and favored bills that aimed to
completely exempt state insurance regulation from federal antitrust
law. 65 Stock insurance companies particularly lobbied for completebetween invasion headlines and their efforts to apprehend the consequences of the
epochal, adverse U.S. Supreme Court decision.”); Thomas R. Powell, Insurance as
Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937, 988 (1944). But see Hugh Evander Willis, United
States of America v. South –Eastern Underwriters Association, 258 INS. L.J. 390 (1944)
(“The present United States Supreme Court has overruled another prior Supreme Court
decision . . . and in doing so has done a fine piece of work.”).
59. See Weller, supra note 36, at 589-91.
60. See Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554 (“Pending decision of [S.E.U.A.],
there were unsuccessful attempts to exempt insurance from all federal regulation . . . .”);
Powers, supra note 43, at 317.
61. See Lent, supra note 34, at 412.
62. See Edwin L. Smith, McCarran-Ferguson: A Perspective of Current Trends
and Issues, 14 FORUM 1032, 1032 (1979); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 598
(“[T]he McCarran Act was passed in reaction to the S.E.U.A. litigation.”); Murphy,
supra note 54, at 1544.
63. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv.
670, 672.
64. Smith, supra note 62, at 1032 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in
1945 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 698 (“[T]he McCarran Act
was passed in reaction to the S.E.U.A. litigation.”).
65. See 91 CONG. REC. 1480-1481 (1945) (statements of Sen. Murdock); see also
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 554; Lent, supra note 34, at 412. In particular,
these bills sought to exempt the insurance industry from the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006), the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1915, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29, 52-53
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exemption bills. 66 Just 17 days after the S.E.U.A. decision, the House
passed the Walter-Hancock Bill seeking to completely exempt the
insurance industry from federal antitrust laws. 67
However, on
September 21, 1944, the Senate rejected the bill. 68
The Senate sought to allow federal antitrust law to prevail when
state and federal law conflicted. 69 It advocated for a system of “federal
surveillance” in which the states would establish and implement
regulations concerning rate-making combinations but the federal
government would retain oversight powers. 70 The Senate predicted that
President Roosevelt would veto any complete-exemption bill. 71 The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) also
opposed complete-exemption bills because it maintained that “the
insurance business has no more right to ask for a blanket exclusion from
those acts than has any other business . . . [constituting] interstate
commerce.” 72 Likewise, the Life Insurance Association of America did
not support the complete-exemption bills. 73 The Senate therefore

(2006), and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2006). See
Kimball & Boyce, supra note 38, at 555; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 592.
66. See Weller, supra note 36, at 592. Congress considered the following bills:
H.R. 3269, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R. 3270, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R.
4444, 78th Cong. (2d Sess. 1944); S.1362, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); H.R. 1207, 79th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 1590, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 1973, 79th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1945); H.R. 2021, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); S. 12, 79th Cong. (1st Sess.
1945); and S. 340, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945). See Weller, supra note 36, at 592.
67. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong. (1944); see also 90 CONG. REC. 6565 (1944). The
Senate also proposed a solution by passing the Baily-Van Nuys Bill (S. 1362). H.R.
3270, 78th Cong. (1944); see also Powers, supra note 43, at 322; Weller, supra note 36,
at 592 n.34; H.R. Rep. No. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv.
670, 671 (“Your committee believes there is urgent need for an immediate expression
of policy by the Congress with respect to the continued regulation of the business of
insurance by the respective States.”); H.R. Rep. 873, 78th Cong. (1st Sess. 1943); 89
CONG. REC. A5683-90 (1943) (remarks of Rep. LaFollette).
68. See Weller, supra note 36, at 592; see also 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944).
69. See Lent, supra note 34, at 412.
70. 91 CONG. REC. 1480-1481 (1945) (statements of Sen. Murdock); Kimball &
Boyce, supra note 38, at 554.
71. Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34; 91 CONG. REC. 1087-88 (1945) (remarks of
Rep. Hancock).
72. See Letter from David Forbes to Sen. Vandenberg (Nov. 22, 1944), reprinted in
90 CONG. REC. 82; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34.
73. Weller, supra note 36, at 592 n.34.
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rejected subsequent complete-exemption proposals. 74
The NAIC formulated an alternative approach that eventually
evolved into the MFA. 75 It focused on both preserving state regulation
of insurance and accommodating both state and federal law. 76 On
August 29, 1944, led by President and Massachusetts Commissioner
C.F.J. Harrington, the NAIC Subcommittee on Federal Legislation
produced a report calling for Congress to declare that (1) states could
continue to regulate and tax the insurance industry, (2) the insurance
industry was completely exempt from the FTC and Robinson-Patman
Acts, and (3) the insurance industry was exempt from the Sherman and
Clayton Acts for cooperative procedures related to rates, statistics, and
coverage matters. 77 On November 16, 1944, the Commissioners
released a cohesive legislative proposal known as the “Commissioners’
Bill,” 78 which followed the report by (1) preserving the constitutionality
of state tax and regulation of the insurance industry, (2) mandating that
federal law should not “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state insurance
laws, (3) exempting insurance from the FTC and Robinson-Patman
Acts, and (4) providing a limited exemption from the “non-regulatory”
Sherman and Clayton Acts, including seven cooperative activities. 79
The NAIC approach ultimately prevailed.80 Senators Ferguson and
McCarran introduced an amended version of the Commissioners’ Bill on
December 19, 1944 to replace the unpopular complete-exemption bills. 81

74.
75.
76.

Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 593 (quoting 945 NAIC Proc. 156, 159-60 (interim report of the
Subcomm. on Fed. Legis.)) (“The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
South Eastern Underwriters case confronted Congress, the State Legislatures and the
Insurance Commissioners with a problem-the task of preserving state regulation and at
the same time not emasculating the federal anti-trust laws.”). The Commissioners
sought to “preserv[e] state regulation of insurance, not in eliminating the applicability
of federal antitrust laws.” Id.; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544.
77. 90 CONG. REC. A4403-05; Weller, supra note 36, at 594; Powers, supra note
43, at 323.
78. See 90 CONG. REC. A4406-08 (1944); Weller, supra note 36, at 594.
79. See Weller, supra note 36, at 594. The seven cooperative activities included
including rate making, forms, adjustments, investigations, reinsurance commissions,
and statistics from the Sherman Act, but acknowledging that the Sherman Act was
applicable to boycotts, coercion or intimidation. Id.
80. S. 340, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945); 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945); Weller, supra
note 36, at 595-96.
81. Weller, supra note 36, at 595-96; McFall, A Calendar of the S.E.U.A. Case,
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One week later, the Senate debated and passed the bill with two
amendments. 82 The House and Senate later rejected each other’s
amended versions of the bill and appointed their conference committee
members to achieve a compromise. 83 The conference committee
ultimately reached a compromise bill. 84 The House accepted the new
version of the bill without debate. 85 The Senate discussed and eventually
adopted it on February 27, 1945. 86 The final version of the bill that
Congress passed was nearly identical to the Commissioners’ Bill. 87
President Roosevelt signed the bill into law on March 9, 1945, and it
became known as the MFA. 88 The legislative history does not include
any mention of arbitration, ratified treaties, or the FAA.
3. Purpose and Judicial Interpretations
The MFA thereby embodied Congress’ ultimate response and
solution to S.E.U.A. 89 Congress enacted the MFA to “restore the

265 INS. L.J. 72, 73 (1945); 91 CONG. REC. 330 (1945); Powers, supra note 43, at 324.
82. 91 CONG. REC. 464, 478-88 (1945). The Senate Judiciary Committee
recommended the first amendment related to the antitrust law’s applicability to
boycotts, coercion, and intimidation. It was relatively uncontroversial. Id. The Senate
quickly adopted it. The second amendment concerned whether states should be allowed
to pass laws contrary to the Sherman and Clayton Acts while regulating insurance. 91
CONG. REC. 479-87 (1945); Weller, supra note 36, at 596. Ultimately, the Senate
decided that the states should not be permitted to regulate the insurance industry
inconsistently with the antitrust laws. Weller, supra note 36, at 596; 91 CONG. REC. 486
(1945).
83. 91 CONG. REC. 1208 (1945); Powers, supra note 43, at 325.
84. The compromise bill featured a new clause stating that that the Sherman,
Clayton, and FTC Acts “shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law.” 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945); Powers,
supra note 43, at 325.
85. See 91 CONG. REC. 1396 (1945).
86. See 91 CONG. REC. 1442-44, 1477-89 (1945); Weller, supra note 36, at 597.
87. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; see also Lent, supra note 34, at 412 (“The
resulting bill came out of the conference committee almost exactly like a bill proposed
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. (“‘NAIC’”) (citing NAIC
Proc. 157-60 (1945))).
88. See Powers, supra note 43, at 325. The Roosevelt administration had also
opposed legislation establishing a federal regulatory agency for insurance and remained
hesitant to interfere with states’ regulation of the industry. See also Weller, supra note
36, at 597; see also 91 CONG. REC. 482 (1945).
89. See Smith, supra note 62, at 1032 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted
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supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regulation.” 90 The
House and Senate Reports on S. 340 continuously expressed concerns
about preserving state insurance regulation and taxation under the
Commerce Clause. 91 In 1945, the House Committee on the Judiciary
explained that the goal of the Act was to “declare that the continued
regulation . . . by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest.” 92 Senator Ferguson stated that the purpose of the MFA
was to “establish the law as it was supposed to be prior to the rendering
of the recent opinion of the Supreme Court . . .” 93 Likewise, Senator
McCarran stated,
There is a domination today by the bureaucracy and there were few
people, I am satisfied, in Washington, that were licking their chops
when they know that the United States Supreme Court declared that
the insurance business of America was interstate commerce. What a
great bureau could be built . . . putting out of business these 48
94
Commissioners here.

Overall, Congress believed that the states were better equipped to
handle insurance regulation 95 and intended to prevent a federal insurance
bureaucracy. 96
However, Congress did not intend to “entirely overrule S.E.U.A., as
the federal law would still apply in certain circumstances.” 97 The bill
did not completely exempt the insurance industry from federal antitrust

in 1945 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass’n.”); see also Weller, supra note 36, at 598 (“[T]he McCarran Act
was passed in reaction to [the South-Eastern Underwriters] litigation.”).
90. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 79-68, at 2 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 1-2 (1945).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670,
672; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544.
93. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; see also 91 CONG. REC. 478 (1945); Lent,
supra note 34, at 412 (“[M]aintenance of existing state regulation and taxation was the
legislators’ preeminent objective”); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429,
430 (1946); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
94. Lent, supra note 34, at 413.
95. See id. at 412; see also Note, Applications of Federal Antitrust Laws to the
Insurance Industry, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1093-94 (1962).
96. See Lent, supra note 34, at 413.
97. Id.; see also Weller, supra note 36, at 602; Smith, supra note 62, at 1032-43.
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law, 98 but instead temporarily suspended the application of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to “assure more adequate regulation of this business in
the States.” 99 Overall, under the MFA, Congress intended federal law to
apply to the insurance industry only when it directly regulates the
industry. Congress only prevented federal “ancillary legislation” from
impinging upon states’ regulatory regimes. 100
The Supreme Court has also continuously articulated that Congress
designed the Act to preserve state regulation and taxation from
constitutional challenge. 101 In interpreting the MFA, particularly the
provision at issue in the circuit split, the Supreme Court has reserved
room for federal regulations. The Court noted that the Act does “not
seek to insulate state insurance regulation from the reach of all federal
law.” 102 In addition, the Court has reiterated that the Act’s main purpose
is to “protect state regulation . . . against inadvertent federal intrusion—
say, through enactment of a federal statute that describes an affected
activity in broad, general terms, of which the insurance business happens
to constitute one part.” 103 The Act’s application to international
commerce remains contested and unclear, particularly its applicability to
treaties such as the New York Convention that conflict with state law. 104
98.
99.
100.

1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 672 (1945); Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544.
1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 670, 672 (1945).
See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv.
670, 672 (stating that one of the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that “no act
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any State law which
regulates . . . the insurance business, unless such act specifically so provides”); Murphy,
supra note 54, at 1544.
101. See Weller, supra note 36, at 599; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408, 429-30 (1946) (“Obviously Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to
existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.
This was done in two ways. Once by removing obstructions which might be thought to
flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise expressly
provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other was by declaring expressly
and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this business is in the
public interest and that the business and all who engage in it ‘shall be subject to’ the
laws of the several states in these respects.”).
102. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996).
103. Id.
104. Compare In re Arbitration Between W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
(Lux.) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La.
Feb. 18, 1992) (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to contracts made under
the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, not to foreign
commerce.”), with Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F.
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4. The MFA’s Controversial Nature
The MFA’s insulation of the insurance industry has become
controversial since several major insurance companies failed in the
1980s. 105 Many characterize the MFA as an “emergency measure” with
a broad exemption that favored the insurance industry but has since led
to varying applications. 106
The Supreme Court suggested that the exemption should be
increasingly narrowed to comport with the Act’s intent. 107 Many courts
and commentators have even regarded the Act as controversial in its
application to antitrust. 108 For instance, Lent states, “A thorough
investigation into the McCarran Act and ensuing development cannot
help but make one wonder whether it was all “much ado about nothing,”
in the sense that the antitrust exemption was probably unnecessary in
order to provide the limited protection originally intended by
Congress.” 109 She further explains that “misapplication of the Act . . .
has served as a valuable escape for the insurance industry from the
heavy burden of defending a federal antitrust suit on the merits.” Critics
have observed that state standards are too vague, regulatory staffs
inadequate, rating bureaus dominated by the industry, and state
provisions erratically enforced.” 110 “The ultimate allocation of authority
over the insurance industry must inevitably bear upon our ‘delicate

Supp. 2d 1293, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (rejecting the reasoning of England Ship
Owners).
105. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 15-18. From 1985 through 1986,
liability insurance rates rapidly increased throughout the United States and limited the
availability of insurance, which adversely impacted school boards, municipalities,
charities, and smaller businesses. See id.; Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the
Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 399 (1987); Susan Pulliam, Mutual Benefit
Life is Expected to Ask State to Take Over as Early as Today, WALL ST. J., July 15,
1991, at A3.
106. See Lent, supra note 34, at 416; see also Rosdeitcher, Recent Judicial
Interpretation of the McCarran Act Antitrust Exemption, 13 FORUM 867, 875 (1978);
Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemptions: McCarran-Ferguson, The Boycott
Exception, and The Public Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 140, 140-43 (1973).
107. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co v. Barry, 98 S. Ct. 2923, 2929-30 (1978); see
also Lent, supra note 34, at 416.
108. Lent, supra note 34, at 429.
109. Id.; Whiting, The Case for Retaining the Exemption, 13 FORUM 917, 933
(1979).
110. Lent, supra note 34, at 430 n.289.
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balance of federalism.’” 111
Congress has held hearings and submitted legislation to overturn
the Act’s antitrust exemption. 112 In addition, the General Accounting
Office and congressional committees became critical of state regulators
handling insurers who face financial difficulty and proposed applying
federal regulatory oversight to the industry. 113 Others sought to establish
a presidential commission to regularly review the industry. 114 Scholars
have called for “a comprehensive review of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s pattern of regulatory federalism.” 115 Over the past century, the
debate over state versus federal regulation of insurance has continued to
rage, but it has now embroiled arbitration. 116
B. FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
In the insurance context, parties often elect to resolve disputes
through arbitration. 117 Insurance parties generally prefer arbitration over
traditional litigation because arbitration is more efficient and offers

111. Id. at 433 (“[W]e recognize that a national statute affecting the ability of a state
to regulate insurance, in the manner of its own choosing poses significant issues of
federalism.”).
112. See, e.g., H.R. 4813, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), 2009 CONG US HR 4813
(Westlaw) (seeking to “restor[e] application of antitrust laws to insurers” by adding a
clause in section 3 of the MFA stating, “[n]othing contained in this Act shall modify,
impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to price
fixing, market allocation, or monopolization (or attempting to monopolize) by a person
engaged in the business of insurance”); see also H.R. 1081, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007), 2007 CONG US HR 1081 (Westlaw) (seeking to amend the MFA “to further
competition in the insurance industry”); Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 15-18;
Compromise Isn’t Imminent on Bill to Alter McCarran-Ferguson Exemption, 62
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.REP. (BNA) No. 1569, 757 (June 11, 1992).
113. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Insurance Regulation: Assessment of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (1991) (testimony before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce); Steven Brostoff, Feds Unlikely to Pass Insurer Regs in 1993, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER, Mar. 15, 1993, at 4.
114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 17; S.1276, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991)
(Presidential Insurance Commission Act).
115. See Macey & Miller, supra note 23, at 17.
116. Compare Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
587 F.3d 714, 714 (5th Cir. 2009) with Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 41
(2nd Cir. 1995).
117. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1540-41.
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several advantages, such as privacy, finality, simplified procedures, cost
reduction, and speed. 118 Although commercial parties desire and
contract for these benefits, many states limit the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts. 119 For instance, in the
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision, a Louisiana statute stated that arbitration
agreements in reinsurance agreements were unenforceable. 120
Arbitration remains an integral component in international and
domestic business relations. It allows individuals to submit a dispute to
one or more impartial adjudicators, who ultimately render a final
binding decision. 121 Arbitration promotes international business by (1)
assuring businesspeople that a qualified neutral party, whose skill
enables him or her to understand their business’ intricacies, will
adjudicate any dispute arising from their transactions and (2) providing
parties with awards that are globally enforceable through the New York
Convention, unlike litigation awards, which are not protected by any
comparable treaty. 122 Parties may jointly elect to submit their disputes

118. Id.; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly-Held
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 340 (2007) (“[T]he bulk of authority seems to
agree that arbitration is a more efficient dispute resolution process than litigation.”).
119. See, e.g., supra note 7.
120. 587 F.3d at 715.
121. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION
FOR
BUSINESS
PEOPLE
5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5010.
122. See Edward Ti Seng Wei, Why Egregious Errors of Law May Yet Justify a
Refusal of Enforcement Under the New York Convention, 2009 SING. J. LEGAL STUD.
592, 592 (2009); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION v (2003); ROBIN BURNETT & VIVIENNE BATH, LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN AUSTRALASIA 451-52 (2009); DAVID K. SCHOLLENBERGER
& STEVEN P. FINIZIO, 1 TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 8:1 (2010) (“One
key advantage is that, as a result of international conventions, arbitration awards are
generally more widely enforceable outside the country of issue than court judgments.”);
Daniel M. Kolkey, Dispute Resolution and International Commercial Agreements, 676
PLI/Comm 527, 531 (1993); Laure Leservoisier & Clifford Chance, Enforcing
Arbitration Awards and Important Conventions, in THE ARBITRATION PROCESS:
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 255-56 (Dennis Campbell
& S. Meek eds., 2002) (“One of the main advantages of international arbitration over
litigation in national courts is that, due to the existence of a number of international
conventions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, foreign
arbitral awards are, in principle, readily enforceable in many countries.”); Baxter Int’l,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that arbitrators are free to
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to arbitration in one of two ways. First, from the outset of their dealings,
parties may incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts at the time
they enter into the contract, agreeing that any dispute arising out of it
“shall be settled by arbitration . . .” 123 Alternatively, parties may sign an
agreement submitting an existing dispute to arbitration. 124 When a
dispute arises, parties jointly select a neutral arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators knowledgeable in their field. 125 The arbitrator or panel
conducts hearings in which the parties present their case and then
renders an award. 126 Both domestic and international parties often prefer
to resolve their disputes through arbitration rather than through
traditional litigation because arbitration is more efficient and offers
several advantages. 127
This Part explains the current legal framework governing
arbitration in the United States, including the New York Convention and
the FAA.
1. New York Convention
Drafted under the auspices of the United Nations in 1958, the New
York Convention calls upon ratifying States to recognize and enforce
foreign arbitral awards. 128 Acknowledging that arbitration is an integral
aspect of international commercial comity, 129 the Convention sets forth a
framework creating global dispute resolution mechanisms for conflicts
arising under international agreements. 130 Ratified by 144 States, 131 the
decide the law and facts in arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement);
Sphere Drake Ins. Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins., Co., 307 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding
that under an arbitration agreement, parties are free to specify how they will select
neutral arbitrators).
123. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 121, at 18.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id. at 19-25.
127. See Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced
Legislative Response 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 362 (2010); see also Eisenberg & Miller,
supra note 118, at 340 (“[T]he bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration is a
more efficient dispute resolution process than litigation.”); Edward Brunet, The Core
Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 3, 3-28 (2006).
128. See New York Convention, supra note 5; McGill, supra note 127, at 362.
129. Murphy, supra note 55, at 1540-41.
130. See New York Convention, supra note 5.
131. See UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/
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Convention remains the “‘backbone’ to the acceptance of international
arbitration by the business world.” 132
a. Text
Article I of the Convention provides for the enforcement of
international arbitration agreements. 133
Enforcement requires an
“agreement in writing” that is “signed by the parties.” 134 Article II
discusses States’ duties to enforce agreements to arbitrate, stating,
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.

In Article III, the Convention directs domestic courts to “recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them under the rules of procedure
of the territory where the award is relied upon.” 135 It prohibits States
from “impos[ing] substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees
or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards . . .” 136
b. Implementing Legislation
Congress implemented the treaty in the Convention Act, which
incorporates the FAA to the extent that it does not conflict with the New
York Convention. 137 The Act makes the Convention enforceable in
United States federal courts. 138 The implementing legislation diverges
from the treaty only in its language instructing courts to compel

NYConvention_status.html.
132. Wei, supra note 122, at 592; LEW ET AL., supra note 123, at v.
133. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006); Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n
(Bermuda) Ltd., 601 F.3d 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2010); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v.
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir.1997) (“[T]he FAA and the Convention
have ‘overlapping coverage’ to the extent that they do not conflict”) (quoting Bergesen
v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir.1983)).
138. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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arbitration if the parties have a valid arbitration agreement. 139 It uses
permissive language instead of the Convention’s mandatory language in
Article II, stating that a court “may direct that arbitration be held in
accordance with” an agreement 140 and that any award conferred under
such an agreement “shall [be] confirm[ed] unless [the court] finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the Convention.” 141
c. Policy and Judicial Interpretations
Arbitration offers significant benefits to commercial parties
engaged in cross-border transactions and promotes their willingness to
participate in global business. 142 The Convention provides a neutral
forum for international dispute resolution “without the perception of the
home court advantage or territorial bias.” 143 Furthermore, foreign
companies tend to fear litigation in the American legal system with its
prospect of awarding plaintiffs putative damages. 144 Arbitration allows
foreign parties to avoid excessive damages and retain more control over
the awards system. Conversely, American commercial parties similarly
fear litigating in other countries’ courts. 145 The Convention therefore
139. Letter from H.G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Sec’y for Cong. Relations,
Dep’t of State, to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Dec.
3, 1969) (requesting the enactment of the implementing legislation for the Convention),
attached to and made a part of H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181 (1970) (“[S]ection 206 is
permissive rather than mandatory.”).
140. 9 U.S.C. § 206.
141. 9 U.S.C. § 207. The House Report further explained that section 206 “is simply
an instruction to domestic courts regarding venue and concerns inherent to the
enforcement of the language of the Convention.” H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2 (1970).
142. Brief for Professors of International Arbitration by Siegfried Wiessner as
Amicus Curiae, Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas AG, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REPORT 137, 139 (1998) (“[T]he capacity to incorporate in international contracts
enforceable obligations to use an agreed-upon neutral forum is a critical part of the
willingness of commercial parties to enter into transborder contracts and, in short, to
participate in the global economy.”).
143. McGill, supra note 127, at 364-65; Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of
Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1189, 1194-99 (2003).
144. Id.
145. See Beijing Arbitration Commission, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution,
East Meets West: An International Dialogue On Mediation and Med-Arb in the United
States and China, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 379, 384 (2009) (“American business does
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creates more certainty and predictability among commercial parties.
Arbitrators are also more likely to understand the nuances of the parties’
specialized business relations. 146 By establishing a dispute resolution
regime that affords parties a high degree of “neutrality and
understanding of the specific issues in conflict” apart from domestic
court systems, the Convention allows commercial parties to develop
autonomous business relationships independent of their countries,
provides them with predictability regarding how they will resolve any
potential disputes, and assures parties that their awards will be enforced,
unlike litigation awards where no such assurance exists. 147
Federal law strongly favors arbitration in international commercial
transactions. 148 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Supreme Court
explained the Convention’s objectives “to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
not want to be in a foreign court. That’s why, in every contract that is drafted, an
American business will spend a lot of time drafting a dispute resolution clause setting
up a system for resolving the dispute, which more than likely ends up in arbitration.”);
Ya-Wei Li, Dispute Resolution Clauses In International Contracts: An Empirical Study,
39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 789, 790 (2006) (“[U]nderstanding the language of foreign
courts and navigating their complex procedural laws are anathema to many American
businesses and their lawyers.”); HAROLD BROWN ET AL., FRANCHISING REALITIES AND
REMEDIES § 5.03A (2003) (“The United States Supreme Court has underwritten the
enforceability of international arbitration covenants, particularly as the parties’ choice
to avoid the uncertainties of litigation in foreign courts.”); 1 TRANSNAT’L JOINT
VENTURES § 1:22 (2010) (“[H]uge court backlogs and undeveloped legal systems scare
off Americans from using courts in many foreign countries, and both parties tend to fear
a “home court” advantage going to the other side.”); James J. Meyers, International
Construction Dispute Resolutions and New Alternatives, 3 INT’L CONSTR. L. REV. 221
(1986) (explaining that American construction companies favor arbitration of disputes
arising from construction contracts because “[l]itigation of international construction
contract disputes in a foreign court often presents serious disadvantages to Americans”
in that courts may “openly favor their own nationals,” “foreign court procedures are
often complex and unpredictable[,] “[f]oreign local counsel will usually not be familiar
with the history of the contract and the disputes, lack necessary technical expertise
[and’ adequate background in the law and public policy with respect to the contact
period[,] . . . [and] there are few effective mechanisms for enforcing foreign
judgments”).
146. See Wei, supra note 122, at 592; see also DOMINICO DI PIETRO & MARTIN
PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARDS: THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION OF 1958 11 (2001).
147. See id.
148. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); Del Orbe v.
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
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contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.” 149
Congress’ implementation of the Convention further reflects that the
federal government supports enforcing arbitral agreements, and
awards. 150
In deciding a motion to compel arbitration involving an
international commercial agreement under the Convention, courts
conduct a “very limited inquiry.” 151 Where a dispute arises from an
international commercial agreement, a court must enforce the agreement
and compel arbitration under the Convention if the agreement meets the
following four jurisdictional pre-requisites: (1) it is in writing 152 (2) the
agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the
Convention, 153 (3) the agreement arose from a “commercial” legal
relationship, 154 and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American
citizen 155 or the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation

149.
150.
151.

See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
See id.
See Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1030 (2002); DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir.
2000); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1982).
152. New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. II(1)-(2); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294,
n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); Ledee,
684 F.2d at 186-87 (“A court presented with a request to refer a dispute to arbitration . .
. must resolve four preliminary questions: (1) Is there an agreement in writing to
arbitrate the subject of the dispute?”). Article II, section 2 of the Convention provides,
“[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams.” New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. II(1)-(2).
153. New York Convention, supra note 5, arts. I(1), (3); 9 U.S.C. § 206; see also
Declaration of the United States upon accession, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29
(1982 Supp.); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp., 333 F.3d at 449;
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87 (“Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory
of a signatory of the Convention?”).
154. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(3); 9 U.S.C. § 202; see also
Declaration of the United States upon accession, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29
(1982 Supp.); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, n.7; Std. Bent Glass Corp., 333 F.3d at 449;
Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87.
155. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. I(3). An “American citizen” for
the purpose of commercial entities includes any company incorporated or having its
principal place of business in the United States. William W. Park, When The Borrower
And The Banker Are At Odds: The Interaction Of Judge And Arbitrator In Trans-border
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with one or more foreign states. 156 A court must compel arbitration
unless the parties do not fulfill one of the four prerequisites or one of the
Convention’s defenses applies. 157 “The affirmative defenses authorized
by the Convention have a ‘limited scope’ allowing parties to avoid
arbitration only where the arbitration is ‘null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.’” 158 The Courts interpret the null and
void clause narrowly and have found that it only encompasses situations
that neutrally apply globally, such as fraud, mistake, duress, and
waiver. 159
2. Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)
Domestically, policymakers and legislators also recognize the
distinct benefits of arbitration, particularly as a “means of reducing the
burden on public courts.” 160 Enacted on February 12, 1925, the FAA
directs courts to stay any judicial proceeding “referable to arbitration” if
the parties present a valid written arbitration agreement. 161 Chapter 1,
section 2 of the FAA promotes arbitration as an alternative means to
resolving disputes, stating that any “written provision . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy . . . arising out of such contract or transaction . .
. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
Finance, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1331 n.25 (1991) (citing A. VAN DE BERG, THE NEW
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 56-71 (1978)); William W. Park, National
Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 681 n.132 (1989).
156. See 9 U.S.C. § 202; see also Declaration of the United States upon accession,
reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. at 154 n.29; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294 n.7; Std. Bent Glass
Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186-87 (“Is a party to the agreement not an
American citizen, or does the commercial relationship have some reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states?”).
157. See Vacaru v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 07-23040-CIV, 2008 WL
649178, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb.1, 2008); Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294-95; Std. Bent Glass
Corp., 333 F.3d at 449; Czarina, LLC v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1292 n.3
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[J]urisdictional prerequisites to an action confirming an award are
different from the several affirmative defenses to confirmation.”); DiMercurio v. Sphere
Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2000).
158. See Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (quoting Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302).
159. See Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302; see also Del Orbe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
160. See Carbonneau, supra note 143, at 1195-99.
161. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 162 Under
this provision, the FAA makes pre- and post-dispute arbitration
agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 163
Congress appended the New York Convention’s implementing
legislation to the FAA in Chapter 2. Other sections of the FAA
primarily relate to federal court. 164 However, section 2 equally applies
to state and federal courts because it covers maritime and interstate
commercial transactions, which could arise in both. 165
3. Preemption of State Law
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 166 the Supreme Court held that the
162.
163.

Id.
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative
History of The Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 123 (2002).
164. Id. Section 3 provides for stays pending arbitration in “any of the courts of the
United States.” Id. § 3. Section 4 allows a petition to compel arbitration in “any United
States district court.” Id. § 4. Section 5 empowers the court to designate and appoint
arbitrators, id. § 5, and section 6 specifies the applicable procedures for applying to a
court. Id. § 6. Section 7 deals with petitioning to compel attendance at arbitration
proceedings and section 8 addresses cases raised under admiralty jurisdiction. Id. § 7.
Sections 9 through 11 establish procedures for enforcing and challenging arbitral
awards, while also allowing parties to raise actions in “the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made.” Id. §§ 9-11. Sections 12 and 13 set forth
procedures for such actions. Id. §§ 12-13.
165. See Sennett v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 272 S.W.3d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.
2008) (2008) (explaining that the FAA’s substantive law applies in state courts while its
procedural provisions do not necessarily bind state courts); Drahozal, supra note 163, at
125; (suggesting that section 2 of the FAA incontrovertibly applies in state court, and
the remainder of the Act has a more limited application in state court under a literal
reading but may be broader under other interpretations); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Cornfield, 918 N.E.2d 1140 (Ill. App. Ct.2009). See generally PAUL COLTOFF, 3 ILL.
LAW AND PRACTICE ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 2 (2010) (“Federal Arbitration Act
created substantive federal law that is applicable in both federal and state courts.”);
DAVID E. RIGNEY, 2 S.C. JURY ARBITRATION § 6 (“Unless the parties have contracted to
the contrary, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies in federal or state court to any
arbitration agreement regarding a transaction that in fact involves interstate commerce,
regardless of whether or not the parties contemplated an interstate transaction.”); JOHN
R. KENNEL, 3A FLA. JURY 2D ARBITRATION AND AWARD § 6 (2010) (“The Federal
Arbitration Act . . . applies to both federal and state court proceedings . . . .”); CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4514 (2d ed.) (2010) (“Federal
law created under the Federal Arbitration Act applies in both federal and state courts.”).
166. 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
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FAA applies in state courts and preempts conflicting state law. The
Court addressed a state law that conflicted with the FAA and found that
it violated the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. 167 The Court stated,
“[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal
courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” 168 Essentially the
Court “‘federalized’ United States arbitration law, ‘restrict[ing] state
legislative rights’ so as ‘to guarantee the ‘unobstructed enforcement’ of
arbitration agreements.” 169 The majority first reviewed the Act’s text
and explained that the interstate commerce requirement in the FAA’s
section 2 indicates that Congress intended the Act to apply in state
court. 170 Citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 171
the Court further found that “‘the purpose of the act was to assure those
who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate
commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal
judges, or . . . by state courts or legislatures.’” 172 Chief Justice Burger
also concluded that the FAA’s legislative history strongly indicates that
Congress intended federal arbitration law to preempt state law. 173 The
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16 (referring to the Arbitration Act).
Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101 (quoting 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.6.1, at 10:25 (Supp. 1999) (describing Southland as an
“exceptionally important” case)).
170. Southland, 465 U.S. at 14-15.
171. 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961).
172. Id.
173. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12 (“Congress had in mind something more than
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”). The Court
quoted House Report 96, which stated that “[t]he purpose of this bill is to make valid
and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the
subject of litigation in the Federal courts.” Id. at 12-13 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at
1 (1924)). The majority also referred to two statements indicating Congress’ objective
to overturn the common law’s refusal to enforce arbitration agreements, quoting the
remarks of Senator Walsh during the 1923 Senate Hearings that the Act “sought to
overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration
agreement.” Id. at 13 (quoting Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) (statements of Sen. Walsh))
(alteration in original); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (noting the need for
“legislative enactment” to overturn the common law precedent). The opinion also noted
that while enacting the Act, Congress was aware that state courts generally remained
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Court noted that Congress “contemplated a broad reach of the
[Arbitration] Act, unencumbered by state-law constraints.” 174 The
majority summarized the FAA’s legislative history, stating,
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old
common-law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state
arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration
agreements. To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to
be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe
Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to
175
meet the large problems Congress was addressing.

unwilling to enforce arbitration agreements. Southland, 465 U.S. at 13-14. It cited
statements in the 1923 Senate Hearings that explained how state courts invalidated and
refused to enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 13 (“Some of our courts have held . . .
that an agreement to arbitrate and to permit A and B to fix the fees of the arbitrators and
so make a final award is invalid, in that it invades the province of the court and sets up
another tribunal that is not provided by law, and in a sense, as some people put it, is
immoral.”). Some of the legislative history of the FAA directly indicates that Congress
intended the FAA to apply to state courts. See Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101.
Although the FAA’s “primary purpose” was to ensure arbitration agreements were
enforceable in federal court, the FAA’s drafter, Julius Henry Cohen, even noted that
Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to require state courts to enforce
arbitration agreements. Id. In 1926, the American Arbitration Association described the
FAA’s scope, stating, “The United States Arbitration Act . . . established a national
policy and procedure for the settlement by arbitration of controversies arising out of
inter-state commerce or maritime transactions, or within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.” Drazhol, supra note 163, at 146-47 (citing Model Arbitration Act (Am.
Arbitration Ass’n 1926), in Model Arbitration Statute Offered, 10 J. AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y 122, 124, 126 (1927)). In a commentary published after Congress enacted the
FAA, the ABA’s Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law discussed the
constitutionality of the FAA making arbitration agreements enforceable in state court
and reiterated Cohen’s Brief’s argument from the 1924 Hearings. Comm. on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA, The United States Arbitration Law and
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925). It suggested that the FAA applies in state
court:
Speaking in general terms, the act provides that written clauses providing for
arbitration of future disputes contained in any contract relating to maritime
transactions (i.e., matters which would normally be embraced in admiralty
jurisdiction) or involving interstate commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable except on the grounds for which any contract may be revoked. The
same rules apply to a submission to arbitration of a controversy already existing.

Id. at 153-54.
174. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
175. Id. at 14.
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The Court further supported its conclusion by noting that limiting
the FAA to federal courts would otherwise “encourage and reward
forum shopping.” 176
Later, the Supreme Court applied Southland to find that the FAA
preempted section 229 of the California Labor Code, which precluded
arbitration of a state law action for wages. 177 In Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, the Court reaffirmed Southland and held that section 2
of the FAA applies in state courts. 178 It found that the FAA extends to
the full reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and
that a contract need only involve “commerce in fact.” 179 Following
Southland and Allie-Bruce, the Court found that the FAA preempted a
Montana statute that invalidated arbitration agreements formed without
conspicuous notice. 180 Subsequently, while narrowly interpreting the
employment exception to the FAA, the Court rejected an argument that
“a state statute ought not be denied state judicial enforcement while

176.
177.
178.

Id. at 14-15.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court also rejected a request submitted by twenty
state attorneys general calling the Court to overrule Southland and preserve the
“powerful interests of federalism.” Id. at 272; see Brief for Attorneys General of
Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265
(No. 93-1001). The states that signed on to the brief were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. Amici Curiae Brief, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265. The
majority did not delve into the FAA’s legislative history, but explained its reasoning as
follows:
The Southland Court . . . recognized that the pre-emption issue was a difficult one,
and it considered the basic arguments that respondents and amici now raise (even
though those issues were not thoroughly briefed at the time). Nothing significant
has changed in the ten years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded
Southland ‘s authority; and no unforeseen practical problems have arisen.
Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon
Southland as authority. Further, Congress, both before and after Southland, has
enacted legislation extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. For these
reasons, we find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established
law.

Id. at 272.
178. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
179. Id. at 273-77. It does not require the parties to have “contemplated substantial
interstate activity.” Id. at 277-80 (quoting Metro. Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal
Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
180. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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awaiting the outcome of arbitration.” 181 It emphasized that Southland
and Allied-Bruce remained the settled standard for preemption doctrine
concerning the FAA. 182
Following Southland, lower courts also consistently found that the
FAA preempted several state laws. 183 Some commentators have
attributed parties’ increasing use of arbitration clauses in contracts to
Southland’s assurance that federal courts would allow the FAA to
preempt state laws and uphold arbitration clauses and awards. 184
4. National Policy and Presumption Favoring Arbitration
In interpreting arbitration clauses under the FAA and the
Convention, the Supreme Court has continuously expressed a strong
presumption favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions in
international commercial transactions, which requires courts to resolve
any doubts concerning the construction of arbitration clauses in favor of
arbitration. 185 “Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal

181. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124-25 (2001). This case,
however, did not decide whether the FAA preempted a state statute. Id.
182. Id.
183. Drahozal, supra note 163, at 101 (citing 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 10.8.3, at 10:96-10:101).
184. Id. at 101; Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization
of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997); see also Richard E. Speidel, Consumer
Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its
Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1998) (discussing consumerization of
arbitration); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 786-88 & nn.92-100 (2001) (cataloguing current and
pending state laws that restrict consumer and employment arbitration).
185. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23
(1983); Mar-Len of Louisiana, Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir.
1985); Seafort Shipping Corp. v. The W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Protection and
Indem. Ass’n, No. 88-4605, 1988 WL 135179, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1988)
(“[W]here a contract contains an arbitration clause, there exists a strong presumption
that arbitration should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that an
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute
at issue.”) (internal quotations omitted); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
794 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1986); Houston General Insurance Co. v. Realex Group, N.V.,
776 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520
n. 15 (1974); Del Orbe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1368
(S.D. Fla. 2008).
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federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” 186 Courts of Appeals
“have [also] consistently concluded that questions of arbitrability must
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.” 187 Some courts have even enforced an arbitration clause
after finding the underlying contract void. 188 This national policy
promotes and upholds private contractual arrangements. 189 In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court
“conclude[d] that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability . . .
require that we enforce parties’ agreements, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.” 190 In light
of the strong national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, courts have created a robust body of federal arbitration law
applicable in both federal and state courts. 191
C. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: SELF-EXECUTING V.
NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
Courts interpret treaties such as the Convention according to the
United States’ body of foreign relations law. 192 They will enforce and
apply a treaty if it is either self-executing or non-self-executing but
implemented by Congress through legislation.193 In other words, selfexecuting treaties do not require any implementing legislation to be
enforceable.
In contrast, non-self executing treaties require
implementing legislation. Categorizing a treaty as either self-executing
or non-self executing is a difficult exercise requiring a complicated
opaque analysis, and Congress therefore often implements treaties
186.
187.
188.

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23.
Id.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
189. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
190. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
191. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984).
192. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 (1988);
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 371 (2006).
193. Id. (“Since early in U.S. history, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . held that, in the
absence of implementing legislation, only self-executing treaties are judicially
enforceable.”).
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through legislation to ensure that they are enforceable. 194 Here,
Congress implemented the New York Convention, stating that the
Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts.” 195 Under the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, “all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land” and supersede state law. 196

II. CIRCUIT SPLIT AFTER SAFETY NATIONAL CASUALTY CORP. V.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
This Part summarizes recent federal cases that have led the circuit
courts to diverge over whether the MFA reverse-preempts the
Convention and allows states to invalidate arbitration provisions of
international insurance contracts. In 2009, the Fifth Circuit decided
Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s,
London and created a federal circuit split over whether the MFA allows
a state law to reverse-preempt the Convention in the context of
insurance arbitration agreements. The Fifth Circuit and many district
courts held that the MFA does not reverse-preempt the Convention and
refused to allow states to nullify arbitration agreements in international
insurance contracts. In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the MFA
protects states’ right to regulate the insurance industry and authorizes
state law prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts to
reverse-preempt the Convention and its implementing legislation.

194. Compare Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (finding that a treaty
between Japan and the U.S. giving citizens the ability “generally to do anything incident
to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens” while within the
borders of the state was self-executing), with United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 87677 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas was non-selfexecuting). See generally Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544 n.106 (“[D]espite the
difficulties of the determination of treaty of self-execution, some trends do emerge:
Bilateral treaties tend to be found to be self-executing more often than multilateral
conventions, and provisions of a treaty affecting or prescribing specific, individual
rights tend to be found to be self-executing more often than those providing for general
obligations of the state-party.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (1787), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed03.asp (“Under the national government,
treaties and articles of treaties . . . will always be expounded . . . and executed . . . .”).
195. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006).
196. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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A. SAFETY NATIONAL AND OTHER FEDERAL CASES
OPPOSING REVERSE-PREEMPTION
The Fifth Circuit and several district courts have opposed applying
the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision to the New York Convention.
1. The Fifth Circuit
In Safety National Casualty Corp., 197 a dispute arose among three
insurers over arbitration agreements in their contracts.
a. Facts
The Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund
(“LSAT”) provides workers’ compensation insurance and entered into
reinsurance agreements with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London
(“Underwriters”). 198 Safety National Casualty Corporation (“Safety
National”) also provides excess insurance coverage and alleged that
LSAT assigned its rights under the agreements to Safety National. 199
Underwriters refused to acknowledge this assignment and maintained
that LSAT’s rights were non-assignable. 200 The agreement included
arbitration provisions, stating that an arbitrator would resolve any legal
disputes between the contracting parties. 201
Safety National filed suit against Underwriters, which then filed a
motion to stay the proceeding and compel arbitration. 202 The district
court granted the motion and the arbitration commenced. 203 The three
parties, however, failed to agree on selecting an arbitrator. Underwriters
then returned to the district court and filed a motion to lift the stay to
join LSAT as a party to the litigation.204 LSAT moved to intervene, lift
the stay, and quash the arbitration, contending that the arbitration
agreements were invalid under Louisiana state law. 205

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted
LSAT’s motion and held that under the MFA, the Louisiana state law 206
prohibiting arbitration agreements in insurance contracts reversepreempted the New York Convention. 207 The Fifth Circuit later reversed
the District Court’s decision and held that the MFA did not allow the
Louisiana state law to reverse-preempt the New York Convention or the
FAA.
b. Holding
The Fifth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc. 208 It again
reversed the District Court’s decision, recognized that the New York
Convention applied, and held that the arbitration provisions among the
companies in different countries were enforceable. 209 Writing for the
majority, Judge Priscilla Owen maintained that the Louisiana state law
did not reverse-preempt the Convention because the MFA does not
apply to the Convention. 210
Following the interpretive framework established by Medellin v.
Texas, 211 the court reviewed the text of the Convention, the Convention

206.

The Louisiana statute stated:
No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering
subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . . shall contain any
condition, stipulation, or agreement . . . [d]epriving the courts of this state of the
jurisdiction of action against the insurer . . . Any such condition, stipulation, or
agreement in violation of this Section shall be void . . . .

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2009). Louisiana courts have held that arbitration
agreements are not enforceable under this statute. See Doucet v. Dental Health Plans
Mgmt. Corp., 412 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (La. 1982) (“Classification of the contract at issue
as an insurance contract renders the arbitration provisions of that contract unenforceable
under [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2009)].”); see also McDermott Int’l, Inc. v.
Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir.1997) (“Compulsory
arbitration clauses in certain insurance contracts are unenforceable in Louisiana because
of [LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868] . . . .”); W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
(Luxembourg) v. Am. Marine Corp., 981 F.2d 749, 750 n.5 (5th Cir.1993) (“Louisiana
has prohibited arbitration clauses in insurance policies.”) (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:868; Doucet, 412 So. 2d at 1384).
207. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d
714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 2009).
208. Id. at 718.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 717.
211. 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation
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Act, and the MFA. 212 It found that the Louisiana state statute conflicted
with the United States’ commitments under the Convention because the
Convention contains mandatory language, stating that signatory nations
“‘shall recognize any agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration’” and directing “court[s] of a
Contracting State . . . [to] refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds
that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.” 213 In addition, the court noted that the Convention
Act similarly contains mandatory language, stating that the Convention
“shall be enforced in the United States courts.” 214
While reviewing the applicability of the MFA, the court
emphasized that the statute only requires courts to construe “Act[s] of
Congress” not to “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state law regulating
insurance unless the Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.
The majority conceded that the Convention and its implementing
legislation do not explicitly relate to the business of insurance, 215 but
then reasoned that the Convention does not constitute an “Act of
Congress” under the MFA because it is a treaty. 216 Judge Owen
remained reluctant to categorize the Convention as a self-executing or
non-self-executing treaty, and acknowledged that the Convention’s
current status remains “unclear.” 217
However, she sidestepped
categorizing the treaty by focusing on whether “Act of Congress”
encompasses non-self-executing treaties implemented by Congress.
The majority maintained that the treaty’s categorization as non-selfexecuting or self-executing is irrelevant because a treaty such as the
Convention is not an Act of Congress. 218 It contended that “[t]he fact
that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not mean that it ceases to
be a treaty and becomes an ‘Act of Congress.’” 219 In reaching this
conclusion, the court analyzed the commonly understood meaning of
of a statute, begins with its text.”).
212. 587 F.3d at 718.
213. Id. at 719 (quoting New York Convention, supra note 5).
214. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
215. 587 F.3d at 720. In footnote 21, however, the court contemplated the possibility
of the FAA relating to the business of insurance because it diminishes business risk. 587
F.3d at 720 n.21. However, it neglected to further opine on that issue. Id.
216. Id. at 721-22.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 722.
219. Id. at 723.
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“Act of Congress” and found that it does not include treaties, even nonself-executing treaties that require implementing legislation.220 In the
court’s view, Acts of Congress include neither self-executing nor nonself-executing treaties because “a treaty remains an international
agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and ratified
by the Senate, not by Congress” regardless of its execution status. 221 In
other words, Congress’ implementation of a treaty does not transform it
into an Act of Congress. The court also reviewed the MFA’s legislative
history and found that nothing suggests that Congress distinguished
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties at the time while
generally referencing treaties in statutes. 222 It additionally noted that the
Convention Act only operates with reference to the Convention itself,
directing courts to the treaty in resolving disputes. 223 To further support
its view, the court cited several cases suggesting that courts may
recognize implemented provisions of non-self-executed treaties as
federal law. 224
After determining that “Act of Congress” does not include treaties,
the court then addressed whether Congress intended state law to reverse
preempt an implemented non-self-executing treaty while enacting the
MFA. 225 Citing Missouri v. Holland, 226 the court found that historically
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 722-23
Id. at 723.
Id. at 730-31.
9 U.S.C. § 202.
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 727 n.54 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Lim v.
Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902–03 (5th Cir.2005) (‘‘It goes
without saying that, upon the United States signing a treaty and Congress adopting
enabling legislation, the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land.’’); McDermott
Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 120 F.3d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to decide ‘‘whether the Convention preempts LA. R.S. 22:629’’); Sedco, Inc.
v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985);
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)).
225. Id. at 727-28.
226. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In this landmark case delineating Congress’ constitutional
powers under United States foreign relations law, the court held that Congress’
implementation of a non-self-executed treaty, which the United States had entered into
with Great Britain to protect migratory birds and Congress implemented, was
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It held the validity of the
implementing legislation turned on the constitutionality of the treaty. Id. at 432. The
court stated, “Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States.” Id. at 433.
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courts have analyzed treaties as distinct from their implementing
legislation and generally do not equate them with “Acts of Congress.” 227
Furthermore, because treaties occupy a superior position in preemption
doctrine, the court found that when enacting the MFA, Congress
unlikely intended the Act to enable state law to reverse-preempt a treaty
or to restrict the United States’ ability to negotiate and implement a
treaty that has a wide-ranging application. 228
Furthermore, the majority declined to apply the last-in-time rule 229
because the doctrine only resolves conflicts between a treaty and its
implementing legislation.230 Here, the court found that this case does
not feature such a conflict because the Convention does not conflict with
its implementing legislation, the Convention Act. 231
Finally, the court further supported its interpretation of the MFA by
stressing the United States’ policy favoring arbitration in international
commercial agreements. 232 It cited Mitsubishi Motors Corp in which the
Supreme Court considered the arbitrability of Sherman Act claims
where parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement. 233 In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., the Court reasoned “[a]s international trade has expanded
in recent decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to
resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade.” 234 The Fifth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court’s assertion that arbitration is fundamental to
the nation’s success in the “international legal order” and that domestic
courts must therefore “subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to
the international policy favoring commercial arbitration.” 235
The Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s analytical
framework, which directs courts to review a statute’s legislative history

227.
228.
229.

Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728.
Id. at 729.
Under the last in time rule, when a statute and treaty conflict, the court will
follow the rule set forth in whichever document Congress adopted last. See Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (enforcing a later-enacted law exempting Hawaiian
sugar from duty despite its conflict with an earlier treaty with the Dominican Republic);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115
(1987).
230. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 728-29.
231. Id. at 729.
232. Id. at 730.
233. Id.
234. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
235. Id. at 638-39.
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when a controversy involving arbitration implicates statutory rights to
discern whether Congress meant to exclude arbitration as a means to
resolve a particular type of dispute. 236 Under this analysis, if Congress
intended to exclude a category of disputes from arbitration, then courts
must assume that Congress would have indicated its intention in the
statute. 237 In the MFA, the court found no indication that Congress
sought to exclude disputes involving insurance agreements from
arbitration or that Congress intended to distinguish between selfexecuting and non-self-executing-but-implemented treaties. 238 The court
relied on Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp. 239 in which
the Second Circuit held that the MFA did not allow a state law requiring
out-of-state insurers to post security before a court proceeding to
preempt the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and noted that the Act
does not “force federal law that clearly intends to preempt altogether
state laws to give way simply because the insurance industry is
involved.” 240 The majority therefore found that the MFA does not
enable states to circumvent the Convention and prohibit arbitration
agreements in the insurance context. 241
c. Concurrence
While the majority remained unwilling to address whether the
Convention is self-executing, Judge Edith Brown Clement’s concurrence
embraced the question and took a more constitutional approach. 242 She
affirmatively maintained that Article II of the Convention is selfexecuting and preempts Louisiana state law under the Supremacy
Clause. 243 Judge Clement supported this conclusion through the
interpretative analysis established in Medellin. 244 Under the Medellin
framework, a court must review a treaty’s text, its “negotiation and

236. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d 714, 730 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1995).
240. In this case, however, the Second Circuit declined to opine on or overrule
Stephens v. American Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 1995). Id.
241. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 587 F.3d at 730-31.
242. Id. at 732.
243. Id. at 732-33.
244. Id. (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)).
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drafting
history”
and
the
signatories’
“post-ratification
understanding.” 245 Judge Clement reasoned that Article II(3) of the
Convention is self-executing because it directly addresses the
Contracting States’ domestic courts rather than the States themselves,
and uses mandatory language that imposes affirmative obligations on
domestic courts, instead of leaving decisions about arbitration
enforcement to the States’ discretion. 246 Because Article II does not
require Congress to pass implementing legislation, Judge Clement
concluded that Article II is enforceable in United States courts on its
own terms. 247
d. Dissent
The dissent presented the opposite argument of the concurrence’s
reasoning. Writing for the dissent and joined by Judges Jerry E. Smith
and Emilo M. Garza, Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod maintained that the
Convention is non-self-executing and that the majority erred in
formulating the question before the court as whether the Convention is
an “Act of Congress” under the MFA. 248 Judge Elrod suggested that the
proper question was whether the FAA, as the Convention’s
implementing legislation, constitutes an Act of Congress. 249 The dissent
concluded that the FAA is indeed an Act of Congress to which the MFA
applies and enables state law to reverse-preempt because the FAA does
not relate to the business of insurance. 250 The dissent also noted that the
Underwriters failed to preserve their argument that Article II is selfexecuting before the en banc court, but regarded the treaty as non-selfexecuting. 251

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-07 (2008) (citations omitted).
587 F.3d at 734-35.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 747-49. This is a question outside the scope of this Note.
Id. at 738, 742, 752 n.31. The concurrence maintained that Underwriters
focused their argument before the en banc court on the question presented by the panel,
and thus did not waive the argument that Article II is self-executing. Id. at 733 n.2.
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2. Lower Federal Court’s Interpretations of
the MFA and Convention
Several district courts arrived at the same conclusion as the
majority of the Fifth Circuit in Nat’l Safety under two different
approaches.
a. The MFA Legislative History Approach
In Matter of Arbitration between the West of England Ship Owners
Mutual Insurance Ass’n (Luxembourg) & American Marine Corp., 252 the
Eastern District of Louisiana found that the MFA only applies to
interstate commerce, not international agreements. The West Of
England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association filed a motion to
order arbitration of a dispute with one of its members, Oil Transport
Group, pursuant to its governing rules. 253 The Oil Transport Group
argued that the Convention did not apply because Louisiana law
invalidated the arbitration agreement. 254 It further argued that under the
252. In re Arbitration Between W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700 (E.D. La.
Feb. 18, 1992).
253. Id. at *1-2. Rule 62 “Arbitration” stated,
If any difference or dispute shall arise between a member or former member or any
other person claiming under these Rules and the Association out of or in
connection with these Rules or any bye law made thereunder or arising out of any
contract between the Member or former Member and the Association as to the
rights or obligations of the Association or the Member or former Member
thereunder or in connection therewith or as to any other matter whatsoever, such
difference or dispute shall be referred to the Arbitration in London of a sole legal
Arbitrator. Such Arbitrator shall be a practicing Queen’s Counsel of the
Commercial Bar and if unavailable any other practicing Queen’s Counsel and a
submission to arbitration in all the proceedings therein shall be subject to the
provisions of the Arbitration Act 1950 and any Statutory modification or reenactment thereof. In any such Arbitration any matter decided or stated in any
Judgment or Arbitration Award (or in any reasons given by an Arbitrator or
Umpire for making Award) relating to proceedings between the Member or former
Member and any third party, shall be admissible in evidence. No Member or
former Member may bring or maintain any action, suit or other legal proceedings
against the Association in connection with any such difference or dispute unless he
has first obtained Arbitration Award in accordance with this Rule.

Id. at *2.
254. Id. at *4. The Louisiana statute R.S. 22:629 states,
No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering
subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . . regardless of where
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MFA, the Louisiana statute preempted the FAA and Convention.255 The
court disagreed and determined that the Convention should apply and
preempt state law because Congress did not intend the MFA to cover
international arbitration agreements. 256 Citing Triton Lines, Inc. v.
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Ass’n. 257 the court reasoned that
Congress intended the MFA to only cover interstate commerce, not
foreign commerce. 258 The court referenced the Supreme Court’s “strong
presumption favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions
whenever possible.” 259 It also noted the trend of courts of appeals’
decisions emphasizing that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . [so
that] any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.” 260
The court further reasoned that “jurisprudence is clear that when
state law conflicts with the Convention, the Supremacy Clause mandates
the application of the Convention.” 261 Citing Southland Corp., it
explained that Congress sought to prevent states from “undercut[ting]
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” 262 It therefore upheld the
arbitration agreement between the Association and the Oil Transfer
Group and found that their dispute must be resolved through arbitration
pursuant to English law under their agreement. 263 The court concluded
that federal arbitration law, not Louisianan law, applied because federal
law preempted state law despite the MFA. 264
Relying on the reasoning in West of England Ship Owners, several
made or delivered shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement . . . (2)
Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer . . .
255.
256.
257.

Id. at *4-5.
Id.
Triton Lines, Inc. v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Bermuda), 707 F.
Supp. 277, 278-79 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
258. 1992 WL 37700, at *4 (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply to
contracts made under the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate
commerce, not to foreign commerce.”).
259. Id. at *2 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the Arbitration Act] is a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”)).
260. Id.
261. Id. at *4.
262. Id. at *4 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984)).
263. Id. at *2.
264. Id. at *5.
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other district courts have reached similar conclusions and enforced
international arbitration agreements under the Convention despite antiarbitration state statutes covered by the MFA. 265 These courts have
consistently found that reverse preemption under the Act did not apply
to international insurance contracts because the MFA was only designed
to apply to interstate commerce, not foreign commerce. 266 They also

265. See Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., No.
02-22196-CIV, 2002 WL 32075793, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002) (relying on West of
England Ship Owners and stating that the McCarran-Ferguson Act “does not apply to
international insurance contracts made under the Convention” because it provides that
“the states, and only the states, can regulate the substantive content of insurance
contracts,” which “was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, and not foreign
commerce”); Jantran, Inc. v. Sphere Drake Ins., P.L.C., No. Civ. A. 2:96CV085-D-B,
1997 WL 88259 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 18, 1997); Continental Ins. Co. v. Jantran, Inc., 906
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1995); McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London, Civ. A. No. 91-841, 1992 WL 37695 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1992); see also
Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc., 847 So. 2d 991
(Fla. Ct. App. 2003). The lower courts are more varied in deciding whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act enables state anti-arbitration statutes to reverse preempt federal
law in the insurance context. Compare Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat’l Life
Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not preclude the application of the Federal Arbitration Act because the state arbitration
statute was not one regulating the business of insurance, but a method of handling
contract disputes generally); Triton Lines, Inc. v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Assoc., 707 F.
Supp. 277 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a state
anti-arbitration provision in the insurance code because a disputed claim, and its
subsequent resolution, is not the business of insurance), and Bernstein v. Centaur Ins.
Co., 606 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted a state policy against arbitrating insurance claims because the state did not
have a statute that specifically prohibited arbitration in the insurance industry), with
McKnight v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
portion of the Georgia Arbitration code was “law regulating the business of insurance”
and reverse-preempted the Federal Arbitration Act by way of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act), Mut. Reinsurance Bureau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931 (10th
Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1001 (1992) (holding that an arbitration clause in a
Kansas reinsurance agreement was unenforceable under a Kansas statute excluding
insurance contracts as valid arbitration agreements because the McCarran-Ferguson Act
precluded application of the Federal Arbitration Act), and Eden Financial Group, Inc. v.
Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 778 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt a state receivership statute concerned with the
arbitration of insurance company disputes because the McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that it is the province of the states to regulated the business of insurance).
266. Id.
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emphasized the national policy favoring arbitration. 267
b. The International Arbitration Policy Approach
Likewise, in Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement
Co., the Northern District of Georgia found that the Convention
supersedes the MFA, but took a different approach. Goshawk, a British
insurer, sought to compel arbitration of a dispute with a Georgia-based
investment company under their reinsurance contract. 269 Goshawk
argued that the Convention and its implementing legislation controlled
the parties’ contract and required the court to enforce their arbitration
agreement. 270 A Georgia statute, however, prohibited courts from
enforcing arbitration agreements in “[a]ny contract of insurance.” 271
The Georgia reinsurer contended that Georgia law invalidated the
arbitration agreement because the state law reverse-preempted the
Convention under the MFA. 272 Although the court agreed that the
arbitration agreement would have been invalid domestically because the
MFA allowed the Georgia statute to reverse-preempt the FAA, 273 it held
that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the Convention due
to “policies recognized in the context of international commerce that
strongly favor enforcement of arbitration clauses.” 274
The court found that the Convention “supersedes” the MFA and
268

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Id. at 1296.
Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(3). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and Supreme Court of Georgia previously found that this statute reverse-preempted
federal law because it was aimed at protecting or regulating the “relationship between
insurer and insured.” See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969); see also
McKnight, 358 F.3d at 858; Love, 614 S.E.2d at 479-80.
272. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
273. The District Court of Georgia previously held that the Federal Arbitration Act
does not preempt Georgia’s anti-arbitration statute under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
because of the FAA’s strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements
in insurance contracts. McKnight, 358 F.3d at 858-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
the Federal Arbitration Act does not preempt Georgia’s anti-arbitration statute due to
the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Love, 614 S.E.2d at 49 (holding that the McCarranFerguson Act “prohibits the [Federal Arbitration Act] from preempting” Georgia’s antiarbitration statute).
274. 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.

644

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

noted that the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Convention generally
prevails over previously enacted domestic inconsistent rules of law. 275 It
found that the Eleventh Circuit limited the defenses available in
international arbitration to those recognized in the Convention,
excluding the MFA. 276 Finally, the court noted that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that the importance of international comity and
ensuring predictability in international commerce require courts to
enforce international agreements to arbitrate, even if the agreements
would otherwise be invalid domestically. 277 The court therefore
concluded that the Convention trumps the MFA due to the “strong
international policy it expresses in favor of enforcing commercial
arbitration agreements” and applied to the agreement because “state law
defense[s are] outside the scope of the affirmative defenses allowed
under the Convention.” 278
Other district courts have adopted the reasoning and international
policy approach articulated in Goshawk. 279 One commentator also
proposed that the Supreme Court should adopt and expand Goshawk and
suggested more international law based solutions. 280
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH SUPPORTING REVERSE-PREEMPTION
In contrast, in Stephens v. American Int’l Ins. Co., the Second
Circuit held that foreign reinsurers could not compel arbitration because
the MFA enables state law to reverse-preempt the Convention. 281
1. Facts
Delta America Reinsurance Company, a Kentucky-chartered

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1303 n.8, 1311.
See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Simon, No. 1:07-cv0899-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 3047128, at *6-7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007); Clow v. Ins.
Corp. of B. C., No. 07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *4 (D. Or. Aug 06, 2007)
(“[M]ore recent and significantly more persuasive authority concludes that the
Convention supersedes the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”).
280. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1544.
281. 66 F.3d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Under the Kentucky Insurers
reinsurer, became insolvent. 282
Rehabilitation and Liquidation Law, 283 the Commissioner of Insurance
oversaw the company’s liquidation. 284 The Commissioner filed suit
against various companies that had transferred risk to Delta, seeking to
both recover premiums owed to Delta and to obtain an order requiring
specific performance of the company’s remaining obligations to pay all
future premiums. 285 The companies refused to pay the premiums,
contending they were entitled to set off the premiums against losses
owed to them by Delta. 286 The Commissioner claimed that Kentucky
state law prohibited such setoffs. 287
All of the reinsurance contracts included broad arbitration
clauses. 288 The British Aviation Insurance Company moved to compel
arbitration abroad under Chapter 2 of the FAA, which implements the
Convention. 289 The Commissioner argued that Kentucky law prohibited
compelling a liquidator to arbitrate, invalidated the arbitration clauses,
and preempted the FAA and the Convention under the MFA. 290
2. Holding
The Second Circuit agreed with the Commissioner. 291 It explained
that the Supremacy Clause and rules of statutory construction would
normally allow the FAA and Convention to preempt state law. 292
However, the MFA protects state statutes “enacted ‘for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance’ from preemption and leaves the
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. at 42.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.33-010 (1994).
66 F.3d at 42.
Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Kentucky Liquidation Act states:
If there is a delinquency proceeding under this subtitle, the provisions of this
subtitle shall govern those proceedings, and all conflicting contractual provisions
contained in any contract between the insurer which is subject to the delinquency
proceeding and any third party, including, but not limited to, the choice of law or
arbitration provisions, shall be deemed subordinated to the provisions of this
subtitle.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-010(6) (1994).
291. 66 F.3d at 45.
292. Id. at 43.
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regulation of the business of insurance to the states.” 293 In a terse
opinion, the court found that the FAA and the Convention do not
specifically relate to the business of insurance under the Supreme
Court’s three-part test for determining whether a particular practice
The court found that
constitutes the business of insurance. 294
reinsurance practices are part of the business of insurance because
“[a]ny transaction between an insurer and a reinsurer is principally the
same as a transaction between an original policyholder and an insurer, as
both center around the transfer of risk.” 295 Furthermore, the court found
that the Kentucky Liquidation Act regulates the business of insurance. 296
The foreign reinsurance corporations argued that even if the
Kentucky statute preempted the FAA, the Convention still requires
arbitration of their claims because it trumps the state statute under the
Supremacy Clause. 297 The court rejected this argument. 298 It instead
found that the Convention is non-self-executing and relies upon the
FAA, which is an Act of Congress, for its implementation. 299 Citing
Foster v. Neilson, the Second Circuit reasoned that a treaty is not a
legislative act, but instead a contract between two nations. 300 It
explained that a treaty is equivalent to a legislative act when it operates
itself without any implementing legislation. 301 The court concluded that
the MFA allowed state law to reverse-preempt the Convention because
the FAA, as the Convention’s implementing legislation, does not
preempt the Kentucky statute. 302 It further determined that the
Convention itself does not apply. 303 The court therefore held that the
Convention was reverse-preempted under the MFA by the Kentucky
state law, which rendered the arbitration agreement between the parties
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reinsurance refers to the practice whereby primary insurers, who have assumed
the risk from their policy holders in exchange for premiums, transfer portions of that
risk to reinsurers in exchange for premiums pursuant to reinsurance agreements. Id. at
42. Reinsurers then transfer portions of the assumed risk to their own reinsurers, thereby
spreading the risk of one policyholder among a variety of insurers. Id.
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unenforceable.304

III. A RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
This Part proposes a legislative and judicial solution to the split in
authority over whether the MFA allows state law prohibiting arbitration
agreements to reverse-preempt the Convention. Part A suggests that
Congress should incorporate an arbitration exemption into the MFA,
providing that state law cannot reverse-preempt the Convention. Part B
suggests how the Supreme Court should interpret the MFA and the
Convention to resolve the split in authority in favor of arbitration.
A. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE MFA
Congress should amend the MFA to ensure the validity of
arbitration agreements in international insurance contracts and protect
the United States’ economic competitiveness. The amendment should
accommodate both insurers and states and strike an appropriate balance
between their interests. States have a recognized interest in continuing
to regulate the insurance industry as they have done for over a
century. 305 However, the international business community has an
304.
305.

Id. at 45.
See supra notes 31-38, 61-65 and accompanying text. Whether the MFA may
reverse-preempt the FAA in the domestic context and the balance that Congress should
strike between insurers and states in the domestic context is outside the scope of this
Note. Instead, this Note focuses on the delicate balance that Congress must strike
between states and international insurers in the context of the Convention. Courts and
commentators have debated on the extent to which the MFA should or should not
reverse preempt the FAA. Compare, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v.
Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that the MFA allowed a Mississippi
statute, which prohibited arbitration of disputes regarding uninsured motorist and
underinsured motorist coverage provisions of personal automobile insurance policies, to
reverse-preempt the MFA, where an automobile insurer filed a motion to compel
arbitration of an underinsured motorist coverage dispute) and National Home Ins. Co. v.
King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 530 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that the MFA enabled a
Kentucky statute, which invalidated arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, reversepreempted the FAA because the FAA did not specifically relate to the business of
insurance) with Axa Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Financial Group, LLC, 608 F.
Supp. 2d 1330, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that Florida law did not reverse-preempt
the FAA under the MFA and that the FAA applied to life insurer’s claims against
insurance brokers for fraud, negligence, and disgorgement of commissions).
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interest in being able to flexibly formulate their relationships, protect its
expectations, and autonomously define dispute resolution mechanisms in
its contracts. 306 The MFA currently under-protects insurers’ interests
and over-protects states’ interests. Congress should therefore adopt an
exemption to the reverse-preemption provision precluding state law
from preempting international treaties concerning arbitration or other
alternative dispute mechanisms.
1. Drafting the Proposed Amendment
Congress should amend the MFA to protect commercial parties’
ability to effectively structure their transactions and employ efficient
dispute resolution mechanisms. It may accomplish this objective in one
of two ways. First, it may expressly exclude the Convention and other
treaties concerning arbitration from being considered “Acts of
Congress.” Recognizing the unique importance of enforcing arbitration
awards, Congress may adopt a provision and codify it in 15 U.S.C.A. §
1012 (c), stating, “For the purposes of this Act, the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208, and any other treaties calling for the enforcement or
recognition of arbitration awards shall not be construed to be an Act of
Congress subject to section (b).” At minimum, the amending provision
should exempt the Convention, stating in § 1012 (c), “Nothing contained
in this chapter shall render the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208,
inapplicable to agreements entered into by commercial parties.”
Congress may instead include a more wide-sweeping provision in
section 1012 to clarify and narrowly define what constitutes “Acts of
Congress” in subsection (b). However, that possibility warrants further
discussion outside the scope of this Note.
Alternatively, Congress should append the exemption to section
1014, which explains the MFA’s affect on other laws and currently
exempts the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
and the Merchant Marine Act from reverse-preemption. 307 Congress
should amend it to read as follows:

306.
307.

See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1014 (West 2010).
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§ 1014 Effect on other laws
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to
affect in any manner the application to the business of
insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended, known as
the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.],
or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.], or
the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine
Act, 1920, or the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, as implemented known as
the Convention Act [9 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.].

Incorporating such an exemption to section 1014 may be more
appropriate than appending it to section 1012 because section 1014
currently contains exemptions for other statutes.
2. Balancing Competing Interests
Adopting an amendment to protect the Convention against reversepreemption will effectively balance the interests of states, insurers, and
the federal government.
a. Promoting International Commerce and Insurers’ Expectations
An amendment exempting the Convention from the MFA’s reversepreemption provision would protect business parties’ expectations and
promote international commerce. The Convention embodies the
international business community’s expectation that parties may settle
any disputes arising from their transactions in a manner specified in their
arbitration clauses. 308 The ability of state law to reverse-preempt the
Convention and invalidate mutually agreed upon arbitration clauses
under the MFA poses risks for foreign insurers transacting business in
the United States by jeopardizing their expectations. 309 Both foreign
commercial parties and their American counterparts are apprehensive of
litigating in foreign court systems with different standards, procedures,
and awards from those with which they are familiar. 310 For instance,
foreign parties often opt to include arbitration clauses in their contracts
308.
309.
310.

See supra notes 122-29, 143-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3, 122-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143-49.
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because they generally fear a possible award of punitive damages by
American courts, 311 find the broad discovery procedures in American
courts daunting, 312 and harbor misgivings about the jury system. 313 They
use arbitration clauses as a vehicle to transact business with American

311. See Michael F. Hoellering, International Arbitration Agreements: A Look
Behind the Scenes, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 64, 68 (1998) (“In revising the IAR, the AAA
was mindful that many foreign parties often fear a possible award of punitive damages
by American tribunals.”); Jimmie O. Clements, Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages: A
Placebo For America’s Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 197 (1992); Kerry
A. Jung, How Punitive Damage Awards Affect U.S. Businesses in the International
Arena: the Northcon I v. Mansei Kogyo Co. Decision, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 489, 502
(1999) (“There is a second use of arbitration clauses: to protect . . . against the
possibility of punitive damages in an international relationship.”); Adam Liptak,
Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1;
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The U.S. Litigation Environment and Foreign Direct
Investment: Supporting U.S. Competitiveness By Reducing Legal Costs And
Uncertainty, INVEST IN AMERICA (Oct. 2008), www.investamerica.gov.
312. John M. Clark & Erin E. Nulty, Depositions Of Foreign Party Witnesses,
INSURANCE
ATTORNEYS
2
(2008),
available
at
NATIONAL
www.nldhlaw.com/CM/Articles/FTD%20Article.pdf; Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives
To Litigation Of International Disputes, 23 INT’L L. 187, 197 (1989); Gerald Aksen,
The Need To Utilize International Arbitration, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 11, 13
(1984);
ROBERT F. CHUSHMAN ET. AL., CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REPRESENTING THE OWNER
297 (1995) (“American discovery practice is largely misunderstood in foreign nations
and has been condemned as overbroad and unduly disruptive of normal business
activities. Civil law countries (such as France and German) generally view gathering
evidence as a function of the courts rather than the litigants.”); Reports on the World of
the Special Commission on the Operation Of The Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1417,
1427 (1978).
313. Juries
In
Business
Lawsuits,
BUSINESS
EXCHANGE,
http://bx.businessweek.com/juries-in-business-lawsuits/news/ (“Others view juries in
civil cases as easily confused and manipulated, especially in big commercial
disputes.”); George Kimball, Risk Allocation, Liability Limits and Disputes in
Outsourcing, 1018 PLI/PAT 257, 297 (2010) (“[F]oreign companies have as many
misgivings about U.S. juries as U.S. companies do about proceedings abroad.”);
Richard E. Donovan, Explaining the U.S. Commercial Litigation System To Foreign
Executives and Lawyers, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 21 (Feb. 2004),
available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/February/21.pdf; Robert E.
Litan, Through Their Eyes: How Foreign Investors View and React to the U.S. Legal
System, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 13 (Aug. 2007), available at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get_ilr_doc.php?id=1059.
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companies and eliminate such risks. 314 In an arbitration setting, parties
are free to agree on dispute resolution procedures and types of awards. 315
Indeed, Congress originally sought to mitigate business risks by
federalizing arbitration law and adopting the Convention. 316 By
enabling parties to create mechanisms for dispute resolution through
arbitration, parties avoid expenses associated with subjecting themselves
to unfamiliar legal systems. 317 Therefore, insulating the Convention
from the MFA will promote international business and serve the
interests of both domestic and foreign insurers.

314.
315.

See supra note 3, 122-28 and accompanying text.
See Hoellering, supra note 311, at 67-68; Article 28(5) of the American
Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules (as amended and effective June
1, 2009) (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forego
any right to punitive, exemplary or similar damages unless a statute requires that
compensatory damages be increased in a specified manner.”).
316. See supra Part I.
317. See, e.g., Omar T. Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria:
An Overview, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 375, 407 (2010) (“Algeria’s enforcement of
international arbitration clauses protects the rights of foreign investors who are
unfamiliar with the Algerian legal system. It provides investors with the confidence that
disputes will be judiciously heard and enforced.”); see also Erin E. Gleason,
International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid of?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
269, 286 (2007) (“Traditionally, arbitration has been the favored means for settling
international commercial disputes as it provides parties with the ability to bypass
foreign legal systems, and the difficulties related to litigating in unfamiliar forums.”);
Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty To Respect The Parties’ Choice Of Law In
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 66 (2005) (“One of the primary
incentives for parties to agree to arbitration in the international business context is to
avoid being subjected to a potentially hostile foreign forum and an unfamiliar legal
system.”); Rachel Engle, Note, Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where
Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 323, 345 (2002)
(“[M]ultinational corporation may seek arbitration as a means of avoiding the other
country’s legal system, but also, it may seek arbitration in order to avoid being subject
to provisions of unknown foreign law.”); Claudia T. Salomon et al., Arbitrator’s
Disclosure Standards: The Uncertainty Continues, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 76, 77 (2008);
Claire Morel de Westgaver, Arbitration of Joint Venture Disputes (Jan. 8, 2008),
available
at
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Arbitration_of_joint_venture_d
isputes.aspx; ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 99 (4th ed. 2004).

652

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

b. Maintaining Market Competitiveness
Such an amendment is also likely to enhance the American
market’s competitiveness and ability to attract foreign insurers. The
insurance industry has dramatically grown since Congress enacted the
MFA. 318 Like other industries, insurance has rapidly globalized over the
past century, as foreign insurers created and entered new markets and
domestic markets increasingly demand new and varied insurance
products. 319 Due to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign insurers are
now even entering burgeoning markets in developing countries in Latin
America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia. 320 Along with
opportunities presented by globalization, the insurance community also
faces increased risks, such as those posed by terrorism. 321 The United
States must keep pace with emerging markets by maintaining a
competitive market that protects foreign insurers’ expectations and helps
them reduce their risk in international transactions.
Enforcing
arbitration agreements will help international parties reduce the risk
inherent in their transactions and thereby maintain market
competitiveness.

318. Shanil R. Vitarana, Are The Regulatory Frameworks in Asian Emerging
Markets Equipped to Handle the Influx of Foreign Insurers?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 207,
209 (2006); Julia F. Chu, Milliman USA, The Makings of Imminent Insurance Markets
in Asia (2001), available at http://www.milliman.com/pubs/InsuranceMktsAsia.pdf; see
Swiss Re, Exploiting the Growth Potential of Emerging Insurance Markets-China and
India in the Spotlight (2004), available at http://www.swissre.com.
319. Vitarana, supra note 318, at 209. American International Group (AIG), the
leading insurance firm in the world, has an international business network that includes
China, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. See AIG,
http://www.aigcorporate.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
320. See Vitarana, supra note 318, at 209; Swiss Re, Exploiting the Growth
Potential of Emerging Insurance Markets-China and India in the Spotlight (2004),
http://www.swissre.com; W. Jean Kwon, Sch. of Risk Mgmt., St. John’s Univ., Toward
Free Trade in Services: Emerging Insurance Markets in Asia (2001), http://
www.iisonline.org/pdf/W.pdf.
321. Elizabeth Pietanza, Winning the Risky Global Business Game: Parrying the
Thrusts of Terrorism with an International Insurance Coalition, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
85 (2003) (explaining the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the globalization of the
insurance industry).
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c. Protecting States’ Rights
In addition, exempting the Convention from the MFA would not
unduly infringe upon states’ power to regulate the insurance industry
because the Convention only focuses on dispute resolution mechanisms.
Originally, Congress intended the MFA to insulate the insurance
industry from federal antitrust law and preserve states’ right to regulate
it. 322 Application of the federal antitrust laws jeopardized several
practices at the industry’s heart, such as rate-making and other customs
that states had exclusively regulated. 323 The Convention focuses on
arbitration and does not regulate the business of insurance, but instead
regulates general methods of handling contract disputes. 324 It does not
alter substantive remedies available under state law, but merely requires
parties to seek state relief through arbitration instead of traditional
litigation.325 Indeed, the Convention and rules governing arbitration in
general do not impact states’ ability to substantively regulate insurance
practices or the industry’s structure. States’ interest in regulating
insurance therefore does not extend to arbitration or methods of seeking
relief from contractual disputes arising from insurance agreements.
Enforcing arbitration clauses under the Convention would thus not
impair any state interest in regulating the operation of the insurance
business.
322.
323.
324.

See supra notes 55-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir.1971) (“None
of the provisions of the Montana, Illinois, and Colorado statutes to which our attention
has been called regulate the business of insurance. Instead, they are laws of general
applicability pertaining to the method of handling contract disputes . . . Accordingly, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the application of the Federal Arbitration Act and
the arbitration provisions are enforceable in the case at bar.”); Ainsworth v Allstate Ins.
Co., 634 F Supp 52 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat’l
Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611 (1969) (rejecting a McCarran Act challenge to an
arbitration clause by concluding that arbitration statutes do not regulate the insurance
business, but instead “regulat[e] the method of handling contract disputes generally”);
Miller v. Nat’l Fid. Life Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 185, 187 (5th Cir.1979) (“The test under
McCarran-Ferguson is not whether a state has enacted statutes regulating the business
of insurance, but whether such state statutes will be invalidated, impaired, or
superceded by application of federal law.”).
325. J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1762 (2006) (“[T]he
switch from a courtroom to an arbitral forum still leaves intact an effective alternative
means of enforcing private rights.”).
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d. Fulfilling Treaty Obligations
Furthermore, Congress should enact this exemption to ensure that
the United States fulfills its treaty obligations. Nothing in the MFA’s
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow state statutes
to reverse-preempt treaties. 326 The United States should strive to fulfill
its treaty obligations in good faith. 327 It ratified the Convention in 1958
and is therefore under an international obligation to fulfill the treaty’s
objective of enforcing arbitral awards arising from disputes involving
international commercial agreements. 328 Therefore, incorporating an
exemption for the Convention into the MFA would help the United
States satisfy its treaty obligations.
e. Promoting Arbitration
Finally, insulating the Convention from reverse-preemption under
the MFA furthers the objective of Congress and the courts to promote
arbitration. The Supreme Court has reiterated its policy of favoring and
enforcing arbitration agreements throughout the past century. Both the
Court and Congress have recognized the benefits of arbitration in
helping parties achieve quicker and more cost-effective results and in
easing the already over-burdened court system. 329 The Court has also
326.
327.

See supra Part I.A.2.
See Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 388
n.294 (2008) (“The President might yet try to construe U.S. statutory law in a manner
consistent, if possible, with the results of dispute settlement process.”); Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (explaining that that Acts
of Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains”); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 164 (2004) (reaffirming the Charming Betsy canon); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S.
433, 442 (1921) (“While the question of the construction of treaties is judicial in its
nature, . . . courts when called upon to act should be careful to see that international
engagements are faithfully kept and observed . . . .”); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184
(1902) (explaining that treaties “should be faithfully observed, and interpreted with a
view to fulfill our just obligations to other powers”); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (emphasizing a principle of good faith related to the interpretation
of treaties “which our Government could not violate without disgrace, and which [the
Supreme] Court could not disregard without betraying its duty”); Hyundai Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343-44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999); NANDA & PANSIUS,
2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 10:9 (2010).
328. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 138-42, 148-64, 184-90 and accompanying text.
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reiterated the federal nature of arbitration law and the importance of
providing a robust uniform system of arbitration throughout the country,
particularly to prevent forum shopping and to fulfill parties’
expectations. 330 If some states prohibit arbitration agreements in
insurance contracts and others allow it and the MFA allows antiarbitration state law to overtake the Convention, then parties are more
likely to shop for a forum in which to raise their disputes according to
whether or not they desire to enforce their arbitration agreement. 331 In
addition, the unavailability of arbitration and resulting litigation may
make foreign commercial parties more reluctant to transact with
American businesses in light of the increased risk of litigation in United
States courts and thereby disadvantage American businesses. 332
Preventing state laws from invalidating arbitration agreements will thus
further Congress’ goal to promote arbitration as a means of effective
alternative dispute resolution.
Therefore, in order to achieve an appropriate balance between the
interests of the international business community, states, and federal
330.
331.

See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144, 175 and accompanying text; Milo Molfa, Pathological
Arbitration Clauses and the Conflict of Laws, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 161, 173 (2007);
Lawrence Perlman & Steven C. Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of
International Commercial Disputes, 17 INT’L LAW. 215, 218-25 (1983) (contending that
arbitration reduces forum shopping, concurrent jurisdiction, and limited access to
pretrial discovery inherent in international litigation).
332. See HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS , A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2-4 (1989);
see also Melissa Gerardi , Jumpstarting APEC In The Race To “Open Regionalism”: A
proposal For The Multilateral Adoption Of UNCITRAL’s Model Law On International
Commercial Arbitration, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 668, 684 (1995) (“When business
people are exposed to risk in an international business transaction due to the absence of
effective dispute resolution procedures, they can undertake one of two responses. They
can either 1) refrain from engaging in the transaction or 2) assume the risk by increasing
the price of the transaction accordingly.”); Kenneth T. Ungar, The Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards Under UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 717, 717 (1987) (“The arbitral clause
specifies the manner in which are the place where contracting parties are to settle any
future disputes. It has been referred to as ‘an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction.’ If contracting parties contemplate a long-term business relationship
together, mutual self-interest necessitates a quick and amiable settlement of any
disputes between them through arbitration.”) (internal citations omitted); supra notes
143-49.
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government, Congress should adopt an amendment exempting the
Convention from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.
B. JUDICIAL SOLUTION: INTERPRETING THE STATUTE
TO UPHOLD PARTIES’ EXPECTATIONS
This Part suggests how the Supreme Court should interpret the
MFA to resolve the split in authority over whether the statute allows
anti-arbitration state law to reverse-preempt the Convention. 333 Based
on the MFA’s text and legislative history, the national policy favoring
arbitration, and the United States’ treaty obligations, the Supreme Court
should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s approach and hold that “Act of
Congress” in section 1112 of the MFA does not encompass treaties such
as the Convention. The Supreme Court should recognize that Congress
did not intend to include treaties within the scope of an “Act of
Congress” and find that state law does not reverse-preempt implemented
treaty provisions, whether self-executing or not. The MFA’s text,
legislative history, and purpose indicate that the Act does not apply to
treaties or foreign commerce in general. 334 In addition, the United Sates
has a strong interest in satisfying its duties under the Convention and
promoting arbitration as a means for commercial parties to effectively
resolve their disputes. 335 Finally, the status of the Convention as selfexecuting or non-self-executing is immaterial because it nevertheless
remains a treaty in federal law under the doctrine of preemption. 336
1. The Plain Meaning of “Act of Congress”
The Fifth Circuit appropriately found that the plain meaning of
“Act of Congress” did not include treaties but instead only contemplated
legislation when Congress originally enacted the MFA. Before
Congress drafted the MFA, the Supreme Court distinguished between
Acts of Congress and treaties. 337 For instance, in Missouri v. Holland,
333. The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for writ of certiorari and declined
to hear a case that may have resolved the split in authority. Safety National, 79
U.S.L.W. 3195 (2010).
334. See infra notes 363-86 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 138-42, 148-64, 184-90 and accompanying text.
336. See infra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
337. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and
a Call For Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885 (2005) (explaining the fundamental
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the Supreme Court recognized that a treaty only has domestic effect
through Congress’ enactment of implementing legislation.338 However,
the Court drew a distinction between treaties and Acts of Congress,
explaining that even if Congress could not accomplish a particular
objective through a general “Act of Congress,” it could achieve the same
goal through a treaty. 339 Likewise, both earlier and subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court have distinguished treaties from Acts of
Congress. 340 Statutes have also referenced treaties as a distinct category
from congressional Acts. 341 Here, for instance, the Convention’s
implementing legislation explicitly provides that the “Convention . . .
shall be enforced in United States courts . . . .” 342 The Convention Act
itself refers to Acts of Congress and treaties separately, stating that “[a]n
action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to
arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.” 343 Therefore, the
Supreme Court should hold that treaties do not constitute “Acts of
Congress” covered by the MFA and find that the Convention preempts
anti-arbitration state statutes.
2. “Act of Congress” in the MFA’s Legislative History
The Fifth Circuit properly noted that the MFA’s legislative history
distinction between treaties and statutes).
338. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 443 (1920).
339. Id. at 432-33 (upholding constitutionality of Migratory Bird Act and associated
treaty).
340. Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951) (“[A] treaty may be modified
by a subsequent act of Congress . . . .”); Higueras v. United States, 72 U.S. 827, 830
(1864) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the several documents are sufficient to give to the
donee an inchoate right to the tract, within the meaning of the treaty of cession and the
act of Congress subsequently passed to carry the provisions of the treaty into effect.”);
Frevall v. Bache, 39 U.S. 95 (1840) (“There is a difference in the words used in the
Treaty and Act of Congress”); Daniel Cordalis, The Effects of Climate Change on
American Indian And Alaska Native Tribes, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 45, 45 (2010)
(“Tribes retain inherent sovereign powers that predate the formation of the United
States and which are recognized in a complex body of federal law that includes treaties,
acts of Congress, executive branch policies and regulations, and federal court
decisions.”).
341. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (defining reservation
“created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress,
Executive order, purchase or otherwise”).
342. 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1970).
343. 9 U.S.C.A. § 203 (1970).
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reflects that “Act of Congress” does not contemplate treaties.
discussing the meaning of Section 2(b), Senator Ferguson stated:

In

I think an explanation of paragraph (b) of section 2 should be made
at this time. The purpose of that provision is very clear, that
Congress did not want at the present time to take upon itself the
responsibility of interfering with the taxation of insurance or the
regulation of insurance by the States. . . . If there is on the books of
the United States a legislative act which relates to interstate
commerce, if the act does not specifically relate to insurance, it
would not apply at the present time. Having passed the bill now
before the Senate, if Congress should tomorrow pass a law relating
to interstate commerce, and should not specifically apply the law to
the business of insurance, it would not be an implied repeal of this
bill, and this bill would not be affected, because the Congress had
not, under subdivision (b), said that the new law specifically applied
344
to insurance.

In other words, Senator Ferguson explained that “Act of Congress”
is a “legislative act” passed by Congress. In addition, nothing suggests
that Congress intended to surrender its power to implement treaties that
tangentially affect insurance to the MFA’s reverse-preemption
provision. 345 The MFA’s legislative history thereby suggests that Acts of
Congress do no include treaties such as the Convention.
3. Irrelevance of the Convention’s Executing Status
The current status of the Convention as executing and non-selfexecuting remains unknown, but is irrelevant for this analysis because
treaties as a category distinct from Acts of Congress include both nonself-executing and self-executing treaties. The Second Circuit erred in

344. 91 CONG. REC. 481 (1945). During the same colloquy, Senator Ferguson made
two other statements concerning the meaning of section 2(b). “[Section 2(b)] provides
that no Federal legislation relating to interstate commerce shall by implication repeal
any existing State law unless such act of Congress specifically so provides.” Id. at 483.
“In other words, the case before the Supreme Court (SEUA) was a case applying the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. We wanted to have the Clayton Act and the Sherman
Act apply to insurance, but we did not want to go back into all the laws which had been
enacted respecting interstate commerce and apply them to the business of insurance.”
Id. at 486. Senator Revercomb, also a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, made
a statement to the same effect during the same debate. See id. at 485.
345. See supra notes 33-88 and accompanying text.
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summarily characterizing the Convention as non-self-executing.
Determining whether a treaty is self-executing requires a complex
analysis. In its terse opinion, the Court concluded that the Convention
was non-self-executing because it “relies upon an Act of Congress for its
implementation.” 346 However, the Court failed to explain how the
Convention “relies upon an Act of Congress.” 347 It simply cited Foster
v. Neilson for the proposition that a treaty is self-executing “whenever it
operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.” 348 The
Court’s analysis is deficient and tautological in that it explains that the
treaty is non-self-executing because the treaty relies on an Act of
Congress, which is the definition of non-self-execution. 349 In addition,
the Second Circuit oversimplified the analysis courts employ in
determining whether a treaty “relies upon” legislation for its
implementation. As the Fifth Circuit properly noted, the fact that
Congress adjusted United States law to fulfill its international
obligations or the mere existence of implementing legislation alone is
insufficient to indicate whether a treaty such as the Convention is selfexecuting. 350 Because the analysis for determining whether a treaty is
self-executing is complicated, Congress often passes legislation to
implement a treaty as a precaution to ensure the treaty’s effectiveness in
United States law. 351 The Second Circuit provides no other reasons to
support its conclusion that the Convention is non-self-executing. 352
Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court
provided courts with more precise guidance on how to determine
whether a treaty is self-executing in Medellin. 353 Under this framework,
courts must “interpret a treaty like interpret[ing]a statute, begin[ing]
with its text[t].” 354 Using the Medellin analysis, however, the treaty’s
text and legislative history both present equally compelling but opposing
arguments for the Convention’s status. 355 As the concurrence in Safety
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2nd Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829)).
Id.
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d
714, 714 (5th Cir. 2009).
351. Murphy, supra note 54, at 1552.
352. See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2nd Cir. 1995).
353. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
354. Id. at 506.
355. Id.

660

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

National emphasizes, 356 the treaty’s text in Article II contains mandatory
language that indicates the provision is self-executing, explicitly
directing domestic courts to enforce arbitration rights by referring the
parties to arbitration. 357 Alternatively, the Convention’s legislative
history indicates that it may be non-self-executing or contain some nonself-executing provisions because the Senate consented to the treaty in
1968 but the United States did not accede to it until 1970 after Congress
enacted implementing legislation.358 The Convention’s status therefore
still remains unclear.
The Supreme Court should instead follow the Fifth Circuit in
holding that the Convention’s status as self-executing or non-selfexecuting is irrelevant in determining whether it is an Act of Congress
under the MFA because neither non-self-executing nor self-executing
treaties constitute Acts of Congress. Implementing legislation that does
not conflict with a treaty does not displace or substitute it in the
hierarchy of preemption law. 359 Regardless of its categorization, a
treaty remains an international agreement negotiated by the Executive
Branch and ratified by the Senate. 360 Congress’ implementation of a
treaty does not supplant the treaty or transform it into an “Act of
Congress.” 361 Furthermore, Congress did not distinguish between self-

356. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d
714, 752 (5th Cir. 2009).
357. See New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II.
358. 134 CONG. REC. S6700-01 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 487 (1987)); see Federal Judiciary Oversight:
Protecting Small Business: Testimony on H.R. 3578 Before the H. Judiciary Comm.,
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 1998 WL 307174 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of
Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant legal Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of
State) (“To implement this requirement, Congress amended the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 101-307, to add language that expressly provides that the New York
Convention ‘shall be enforced in United States courts.’”); see also Leonard V. Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1070 (1961).
359. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . .”).
360. See id.
361. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 922–24 (2004) (maintaining that Acts of Congress do not
necessarily impact treaties’ status or relevance in US law); see also infra note 363 and
accompanying text.
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executing treaties and implemented but non-self-executing treaties when
using the term “treaty” in various statutes contemporary with the
MFA. 362 Restricting the term “treaty” to self-executing treaties would
be impractical because categorizing a treaty is often difficult and
requires judicial interpretation. 363 To further complicate the analysis,
single treaties may contain both self-executing and non-self-executing
provisions. 364 In addition, self-executing and implemented but non-selfexecuting treaties occupy the same status in preemption hierarchy. 365
362. See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub.L. No. 77-250 § 109, 55 Stat. 687, 695 (1941)
(amending certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to exclude the application of
those sections to residents of certain countries “so long as there is in effect with such
country a treaty which provides otherwise”); Farm Labor Supply Appropriation Act,
Pub.L. No. 78-229 § 3, 58 Stat. 11, 13 (1944) (authorizing the War Food Administrator
to enter into agreements with agricultural extension services of State colleges to furnish
certain services to domestic interstate and foreign agricultural workers and to “require
the modification or termination of any agreement with any such extension service
whenever he finds such action to be necessary in order to carry out the terms of any
treaty or international agreement to which the United States of America is signatory”).
363. See Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human
Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 468 n.255 (2002) (“It
is difficult to tell which treaties will be declared non-self-executing.”); Murphy, supra
note 54, at 1552 (“The self-executing determination, however, is complicated and
nuanced, and Congress will often bypass any chance of doubt concerning the force of a
treaty by enacting implementing legislation.”). Compare United States v. Percheman,
32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833) (declaring a treaty to be self-executing) with Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (declaring the same treaty to be non-self-executing).
364. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. h (1986) (“Some provisions of an international agreement may be selfexecuting and others non-self-executing.”); see also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862, 884 n.35 (5th Cir.1979) (“A treaty need not be wholly self-executory or wholly
executory.”). Sometimes, select provisions of treaties will be determined to be selfexecuting or non-self-executing. See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526 n.2
(1951); Lidas, Inc. v. U.S., 238 F.3d 1076, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 533
U.S. 903 (2001) (“[I]t is far from uncommon for a treaty to contain both self-executing
and non-self-executing provisions.”); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797
n.8 (S.D. Fla.1992) (holding that some provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War are self-executing while others are not); Fujii v.
State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-21 (Cal. 1952); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 203 (1996); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1117-18 (1992)
(contending that parts of the Constitution may be both self-executing and non-selfexecuting).
365. See HENKIN, supra note 364, at 203-04; Brenton T. Culpepper, Missed
Opportunity: Congress’s Attempted Response to the World’s Demand for the Violence
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Congress and the courts do not treat them differently after
implementation. 366 The Supreme Court should therefore recognize that
a treaty’s status as self-executing or non-self-executing does not bear on
the distinction between treaties and Acts of Congress. Therefore,
regardless of whether the Convention is self-executing, the Supreme
Court should recognize that it is not an “Act of Congress” subject to the
MFA’s reverse-preemption provision.
Even if the Supreme Court finds that the MFA applies to the
Convention and the Convention is non-self-executing, the Supreme
Court should still prevent state anti-arbitration statutes from reversepreempting the Convention under the MFA because the “last in time
rule” of foreign relations law dictates that the Convention must
Against Women Act, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 733, 751 (2010) (“[B]oth selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties are U.S. law upon ratification.”); Martin S.
Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties
as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2095 (1999); Yuji Iwasawa,
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26
VA. J. INT’L L. 627, 631 (1986); Virginia H. Johnson, Application of the Rational Basis
Test to Treaty-Implementing Legislation: The Need for a More Stringent Standard of
Review, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 347-51, 349 n.5 (2001) (“Whether self-executing or
non-self-executing, the Supremacy Clause renders all treaties ‘the Law of the Land . . .
.’ [P]er the Supremacy Clause, virtually all treaties should be interpreted as selfexecuting.”).See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
760 (1988); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate
Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
571(1992); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154
(1999). But see Susanna Y. Chung, Prison Overcrowding: Standards In Determining
Eighth Amendment Violations, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2381 (2000) (“[B]oth selfexecuting and non-self-executing--are considered to be the supreme law of the land.”);
John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2091-93 (1999) (propounding an
unpopular view that the Framers intended non-self-executing treaties to be a limitation
on treaty power); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and
Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999). The
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda requires the United States to implement non-selfexecuting treaties in good faith. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May
23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties requires Congress to enact legislation implementing treaty obligations stating
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.” Id. art. 27. “Both self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties are made via explicit action by the political branches.” Derek Jinks & Neal
Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1261 (2007).
366. Supra note 365.
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supersede the MFA. “Where a treaty and an act of Congress are wholly
inconsistent with each other and the two cannot be reconciled, the courts
have held that the one later in point of time must prevail.” 367 Here,
Congress implemented the Convention in 1970, twenty-five years after it
passed MFA. Therefore, because the MFA preceded the Convention,
the Supreme Court should recognize that the Convention prevails over
the MFA.
4. The Distinction Between Foreign Commerce
and Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court should also recognize that the MFA does not
cover the Convention as an “Act of Congress” because the MFA only
applies to interstate commerce and does not apply to international
arbitration agreements under the Convention. As properly noted by
several district courts, the MFA only removed domestic Commerce
Clause restrictions from states’ power to tax and regulate the insurance
business, not Foreign Commerce Clause limitations. 368 The MFA’s text
and legislative history along with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
its preemptive effect strongly indicate that the Act only applies to
interstate commerce.
The MFA’s text suggests that its preemptive effect is limited to
interstate commerce. It provides that states can exclusively regulate the
substantive content of insurance contracts. 369 As explained below,
legislative history suggests that Congress envisioned the substantive
content of insurance contracts as only relating to interstate not foreign
commerce. 370 Therefore, the Act does not apply to international
insurance contracts.
Several district courts properly noted that the Act’s legislative
history indicates that Congress did not intend the MFA to regulate
foreign commerce, but instead only intended it to apply to interstate
commerce. 371 While discussing the bill, the Senate continuously

367. HENKIN, supra note 364, at 222; See also Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310
(1914); Chae Chan Ping v. United States 130 U.S. 581 (1889); The Cherokee Tobacco,
78 U.S. 616 (1871).
368. See supra Part II.A.2.
369. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b).
370. See supra notes 341-61 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part II.A.2.
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referred to the “business of insurance” as “interstate” commerce. 372 In
discussing the purpose of section 2(b) of the Act, Senator Ferguson
stated, “What we have in mind is that the insurance business, being
interstate commerce, if we merely enact a law relating to interstate
commerce, or if there is a law now on the statute books relating in some
way to interstate commerce, it would not apply to insurance.” 373
The Act’s principal drafter, Senator Ferguson, thereby defined “the
business of insurance” as interstate commerce. Furthermore, in
discussing S.E.U.A., Senator Pepper emphasized that the Supreme Court
recognized insurance as “interstate commerce within the meaning of the
commerce clause of the Constitution.” 374 In addition, Senator Pepper
asked Senator McCarran whether “states can regulate the business of
insurance in a way inconsistent with the Sherman Act,” and Senator
McCarran responded that “[i]f they do it, they do it at their own hazard .
. . .[because] Congress has always had the power over interstate
commerce.” 375 Furthermore, Senator Barkley also explained he believed
that “insurance was interstate commerce,” stating,
I then expressed myself as believing . . . that insurance was interstate
commerce; for I have always believed that a policy of insurance
issued in the city of New York and sent to Kentucky or to San
Francisco is just as much interstate commerce as is a certificate of
stock issued in New York and sent to Kentucky or San Francisco or
376
any other State.

He further emphasized, “[W]e can enact such legislation as we may
deem proper and wise to have enacted in connection with the regulation
of this business, which clearly is interstate commerce.” 377 The
legislative history thereby contains numerous references to the “business
of insurance” as interstate commerce.
While the senators continuously described the “business of
372.
373.

91 CONG. REC. 1471-1488 (1945).
Id. at 1487 (statement of Sen. Ferguson); see also United States Dep’t of
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 508 n.7 (1993) (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 1487 (daily ed.
Feb. 27, 1945) (statement of Sen. Ferguson)) (emphasis added); Stephens v. Nat’l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.5 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 91 CONG.
REC. 1487 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1945) (statement of Sen. Ferguson)).
374. 91 CONG. REC. 1477 (1945) (statement of Sen. Pepper).
375. Id. at 1478 (statement of Sen. McCarran) (emphasis added).
376. Id. at 1487 (statement of Sen. Barkley).
377. Id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. Barkley) (emphasis added).
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insurance” under the MFA as interstate commerce, the legislative record
is devoid of any mention of foreign or international commerce with
respect to the “business of insurance.” Alternatively, a statement by
Senator O’Mahoney explicitly suggests that the Senate did not intend the
Act to apply to foreign commerce. While discussing the bill’s proposed
moratorium on federal antitrust law, Senator O’Mahoney stated,
[T]here is not a line or sentence in the proposed act, as I have read it,
would delegate to any State the power to legislate in the field of . . .
foreign commerce. State regulation must be for the State and not for
the United States. The bill does not sacrifice the power of Congress
to regulate in the field of interstate commerce, but wisely . . .
undertakes to say in effect to the State, ‘For this period, take the
378
responsibility and regulate in the interest of the public.’

Because the legislative history contains numerous references to the
business of insurance as interstate commerce, the Supreme Court should
hold that the Act does not apply to foreign commerce.
Finally, subsequent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Act
and its legislative history strongly indicate that the MFA only applies to
interstate commerce. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, the
Court held that the MFA’s reverse-preemptive effect only “exempts the
The
insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions.” 379
Supreme Court found that the Act does not preempt the application of
the Constitution and other federal laws beyond the interstate commerce
limitation.380 Here, Congress derived the power to regulate international
arbitration agreements and implement the Convention under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations . . .” 381 The Convention called for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements in transactions involving commerce and
contracts performance abroad. 382 The Convention was also negotiated

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at 1483.
470 U.S. 869, 880 (1985).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., Inc., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he statute is
comfortably within Congress’s commerce power.”). Article I(3) requires a country “on
the basis of reciprocity [to] declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition
and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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under the Treaty power. 383 The Foreign Commerce Clause and Treaty
power are distinct from Congress’ power to regulate commerce “among
the several states” domestically. 384 Therefore, the Supreme Court’s
precedent establishes that the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision is
limited to interstate commerce.
The relationship between the MFA and the Convention is analogous
to the relationship between the MFA and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act “FSIA”, which courts have found to be exempt from the
MFA’s reverse-preemptive effect. The FSIA regulates commerce with
foreign nations and establishes rules governing the use of federal courts
to adjudicate conflicts involving foreign sovereigns. 385 It provides that
“a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and
execution.” 386
In Moore v. National Distillers & Chemical
Corporation, 387 a federal magistrate judge in the Southern District of
New York held that the FSIA preempted section 1213(c)(1) because the
Act exempts the business of insurance only from commerce clause
limitations. The Second Circuit and Southern District of New York later
affirmed the magistrate’s order and re-asserted the interstate commerce
clause limitation of the MFA reverse-preemption provision. 388 The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, also found that the FSIA
preempted the MFA and recognized the interstate commerce clause
limitation, stating, “(i)n enacting the FSIA, ‘Congress expressly
exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce, along with other
specified Art. I powers(.)”‘ 389 The state court further found that the
383. In re Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir 1985) (“The Convention was
negotiated pursuant to the Constitution’s Treaty power. Congress then adopted enabling
legislation to make the Convention the highest law of the land. As such, the Convention
must be enforced according to its terms over all prior inconsistent rules of law.”).
384. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
385. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891, 2898 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994)); Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 (1983); Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers
& Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 (2d Cir. 1996).
386. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 Stat. at 2898.
387. 143 F.R.D. 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d sub nom., Stephens v. Nat’l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226 (2d Cir. 1996).
388. Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., No. 91 CIV 2901, 1993 WL
228851, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1993).
389. Moore v. Aegon Reinsurance Co. of America, 196 A.D.2d 250, 261 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994), cert. dismissed sub nom., Stephens v. Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil
(IRB), 512 U.S. 1283 (1994) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
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federal magistrate judge properly concluded that “[i]n view of the
paramount importance of the U.S. foreign policy concerns embodied in
the FSIA . . . the preemptive effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not extend to the FSIA.” 390 Similarly, here, in implementing the
Convention, Congress exercised its power to regulate foreign commerce,
as distinct from interstate commerce. 391 As other courts have found that
the MFA does not allow state law to preempt the FSIA, the Supreme
Court should hold the MFA does not enable anti-arbitration state law to
reverse-preempt the Convention.
Therefore, based on the MFA’s text, legislative history, and
subsequent interpretations of the Act, the Supreme Court should
recognize that the MFA is limited to Commerce Clause-based
legislation. The Court should thus hold that the MFA does not allow
state law to reverse-preempt the Convention because the Act only
applies to domestic interstate commerce and not foreign commerce.
5. The MFA’s Purpose of Restoring the Pre-S.E.U.A. Status Quo
Furthermore, Congress did not intend the MFA’s reversepreemption provision to apply to arbitration or dispute resolution
because in enacting the MFA, Congress sought to restore the insurance
industry to its pre-S.E.U.A. state, which included being subject to federal
arbitration law. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., the Supreme Court
explained that “[t]he McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt to turn
back the clock, to assure that the activities of insurance companies in
dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state
regulation.” 392 Congress sought to “restore to the States’ broad authority
to tax and regulate the insurance industry,” 393 but did not define the
“business of insurance” or “regulation.” 394 To illuminate the meaning of
these phrases, one must refer to the history behind the Act, including
legislative history along with the general history of federal and state

U.S. 480, 496 (1983)).
390. Id.
391. See supra notes 360-74 and accompanying text.
392. 393 U.S. 453, 568 (1969).
393. United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 507 (1993).
394. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994); see also Raymond A Guenter, Rediscovering the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 297
(2000).
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regulation of insurance. 395
Nothing in the MFA’s text or legislative history suggests that the
reverse-preemption provision encompasses methods of alternative
dispute resolution such as arbitration, but instead indicates that the
provision targeted areas of law that would substantively impact the
insurance industry’s practices. The legislative history primarily focuses
on the Act’s impact on trade regulation. 396 Nearly all of the floor
debates and amendments made to the legislation related to the extent to
which the MFA would allow state law to insulate the insurance business
from federal antitrust law. 397 The hearings 398 and committee reports 399
similarly focused on antitrust. Therefore, the MFA’s legislative history
suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing federal
law from substantively altering the practices and structure of the
insurance industry, not its methods of dispute resolution.
The expressed purpose of the MFA further confirms that it does not
apply to arbitration law. House Reports on S. 340 indicate that Congress
did not enact the statute to provide the states with limitless authority
over the insurance business, but instead intended to maintain the status
quo of the regulatory system before S.E.U.A. disrupted the industry. 400
The House stated,
It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation
to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of
insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to
the decision in the Southeastern Underwriters Association case.
Briefly, your Committee is of the opinion that we should provide for
the continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the States,
subject always, however, to the limitations set out in the controlling
decisions of the Supreme Court, as, for instance, in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana (165 U.S. 578), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v
Arkansas (260 U.S. 346) and Connecticut General Insurance Co. v.
395.
396.
397.

Guenter, supra note 394, at 297.
See supra Part I.B.
See 91 CONG. REC. 478-88, 1477-88 (1945) (statement of Rep. Russell); 90
CONG. REC. 6551-56, A 3020 (1944) (statement of Rep. Walter); Guenter, supra note
394, at 297.
398. Judiciary Committee Hearings on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270 Before the
Committees on the Judiciary, 78th Cong. 25, 2-8, 31-65 (1943) (statements of Sen.
Josiah W. Bailey & Att’y Gen. Francis Biddle).
399. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 2-3 (1945); S. REP. NO. 79-20, at 1-2 (1945); S.
REP. No. 78-1112 at 2-6 (1944); H.R. REP. NO. 78-873, at 1-8 (1943).
400. Guenter, supra note 394, at 297; H.R. REP. NO. 79-143, at 3 (1945).
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Johnson (303 U.S. 77) (which hold, inter alia, that a State does not
have the power to tax contracts of insurance or reinsurance entered
into outside of its jurisdiction by individuals or corporations resident
or domiciled therein covering risks within the State or to regulate
401
such transactions in any way).

Senator McCarran read the statement into the record before the
Senate voted on the final version of S. 340, and then stated: “In other
words, we give to the states no more powers than those they previously
had, and we take none from them.” 402 These illuminating statements
indicate that Congress did not intend to surrender any power that it
wielded before the S.E.U.A. decision. 403 The Federal Arbitration Act
was passed in 1923 and predates the MFA, enacted in 1945. By the time
the Supreme Court decided S.E.U.A. and Congress deliberated over the
MFA, the FAA had already established that arbitration law was
primarily federal. 404 The FAA contained no exemption for the insurance
industry. 405 The states thus did not “possess” the power to exclusively
regulate arbitration in the insurance industry prior to S.E.U.A., but
instead shared that power with the federal government. Therefore,
because Congress expressed that it did not seek to provide states with
any power to regulate the insurance industry beyond that which it
already enjoyed prior to the S.E.U.A. decision and the FAA’s
federalization of arbitration occurred before the decision, the Supreme
Court should recognize that MFA’s reverse-preemption provision does
not include arbitration law and Congress did not intend states’
“regulation” to encompass arbitration. The stated purpose for the Act—
returning the insurance industry to its status quo— may be accomplished
without reverse-preempting the Convention or the FAA.
6. Policy Implications
This resolution would enable the United States to both promote its
national policy favoring arbitration and fulfill its international
401. See State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1962)
(relying on this report, the Court determined that Congress intended that the Court’s
pre-SEUA decisions would continue to control the authority of the states to tax foreign
insurance companies).
402. 91 CONG. REC. 1442 (1945) (emphasis added).
403. See Guenter, supra note 394.
404. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
405. Id.
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obligations under the Convention.
a. National Policy Favoring Arbitration
Recognizing that the Convention is not subject to the MFA’s
reverse-preemption provision will promote the United States’ national
policy favoring arbitration. As explained above, 406 the Supreme Court
has recognized that the federal policy favoring arbitration “applies with
special force in the field of international commerce.” 407 The United
States adopted the Convention “to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.” 408
Commercial parties transacting business among countries with different
legal traditions particularly find arbitration clauses helpful to facilitate
their relationships. 409 A neutral third-party forum resolves any dispute
that arises “free from the biases of local courts and the vagaries of an
unresponsive judiciary.” 410 Here, preventing states from nullifying
arbitration clauses in international insurance contracts will promote
arbitration in international commerce by respecting and upholding the
agreements of commercial parties transacting globally. Therefore,
excluding the Convention from the MFA’s reverse-preemption provision
would align with century-long federal policy favoring arbitration.
b. Fulfilling International Treaty Obligations
The United States should ensure that anti-arbitration state law does
not reverse-preempt the Convention to fulfill its international
obligations.
The Convention’s effectiveness depends upon its
signatories’ commitment to ensuring that their domestic courts enforce
arbitration clauses and awards. 411 When a signatory nation thwarts
parties’ abilities to enforce awards, commercial parties find themselves
unable to achieve justice, collect their remedies, and effectively do
406.
407.

(1985).
408.
409.
410.
411.

See Part III.A.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
143 CONG. REC. E1438-01 (1997).
Id.
Id.
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business in the nation.” 412 Furthermore, if Congress violates treaties or
fails to fulfill international obligations, “the Nation will be none the less
exposed to all the international consequences of such a violation . . . .” 413
Under Article III of the Convention, the United States has a duty to
“recognize arbitral awards as binding.” 414 Allowing state arbitration
statutes to reverse-preempt the Convention and stymie arbitration among
international insurers would prevent the United States from satisfying
this international obligation. Failing to enforce and recognize arbitral
awards among international insurers may eventually lead to backlash
from other countries, which may disadvantage and overturn the
investment expectations of American businesses.

CONCLUSION
As the MFA continues to provide states with a tool to invalidate
arbitration agreements in international insurance contracts, commercial
parties’ expectations and relations in the industry remain in jeopardy.
To adequately protect the interests of both states and commercial parties,
Congress and the Supreme Court should resolve the split in authority by
recognizing that the MFA does not enable anti-arbitration state laws to
reverse-preempt the Convention and invalidate mutually-agreed upon
arbitration clauses. This resolution would effectively prevent states
from thwarting commercial parties’ expectations as embodied in their
arbitration agreements under the guise of regulating the insurance
industry. Upholding international parties’ arbitration agreements under
the Convention would also comport with the United States’ duty to
fulfill its international obligations and its overall national policy
favoring arbitration as an effective dispute resolution mechanism.

412.
413.

Id.
See HENKIN, supra note 364 at 222 (citing Memorandum for President Harding,
October 8, 1921, Sec’y of State Charles Evans Hughes, 5 Hackworth at 324-25).
414. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. III.

